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efficient  resolution  of  thrift  insolvencies  once  the 
FSLIC  became  insolvent.  Our  suggestions  for reform 
arise  from  an  analysis  of  the  bankruptcy  law  as  it 
applies  to unregulated  nonfinancial  firms,  which  do 
not  have  access  to  the  kinds  of  government  guar- 
antees  provided  by deposit  insurance.  Recommended 
changes  include  incentives  to discourage  depositors 
from  funding  insolvent  institutions  together  with  a 
system  of judicial  oversight  of bank  and  thrift  failure 
resolution  proceedings  similar  to  legal  bankruptcy 
proceedings  established  to  deal  with  financially 
troubled  firms. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  I pro- 
vides  general  background  on private  lending  arrange- 
ments  and  the  nature  of  bankruptcy  proceedings. 
These  arrangements  are  compared  with  the  system 
of government  regulation  and  failure  resolution  pro- 
ceedings  for  insured  deposit-taking  institutions. 
Section  II examines  the  evolution  of federal  deposit 
insurance  and  provides  a  detailed  history  of  the 
savings  and  loan  crisis.  Section  III explores  different 
reform  proposals.  Section  IV presents  a summary  and 
conclusions. 
I.  MARKET DISCIPLINE,  DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE, AND BANK FAILURES 
The  present-day  financial  regulatory  system  is in 
part  a legacy  of the  waves  of Depression-era  bank 
failures.  Legislation  enacted  in response  to the events 
of that  period  created  a “financial  safety  net,”  com- 
prised  of  federally  sponsored  deposit  insurance 
together  with  increased  government  regulation  and 
supervision  of  financial  intermediaries.  (A  third 
important  element  of this  safety  net,  access  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  discount  window,  had  been  estab- 
lished  in  response  to  earlier  financial  crises.)  The 
government  assumed  responsibility  for  protecting 
depositors  in the  resulting  system,  with  the  federal 
deposit  insurance  funds  (the  FDIC  and  the  now 
defunct  FSLIC)  assuming  the  role  of  creditor  to 
insured  depository  institutions.  Acting  in this  role, 
government  regulatory  agencies  assumed  responsi- 
bility  for  ensuring  the  safe  and  sound  operation  of 
insured  institutions.  To  facilitate  this  task,  these 
agencies  were  given  the  authority  to issue  regulations 
restricting  the  activities  of insured  banks  and  thrifts 
and  also  to  supervise  them  to  ensure  that  the  rules 
were  followed. 
When  viewed  from this perspective,  it appears  that 
the  goals  and  interests  of  government  policy  with 
regard  to bank  regulation  should  coincide  with  those 
of depositors  and  other  private  creditors.  But recent 
history  suggests  otherwise.  In  an  attempt  to  under- 
stand  why  the  system  failed,  the  analysis  that  follows 
will  compare  the  incentives  created  by  the  federal 
financial  safety  net  with  the  incentives  inherent  in 
purely  private  financial  arrangements.  We  analyze 
market  mechanisms  designed  to cope  with  problems 
that  arise when  private  funds  are managed  by others. 
In  particular,  we  concentrate  on  the  methods  em- 
ployed  by private  creditors  to “regulate”  the  activities 
of borrowers  and  examine  the  resolution  of creditor 
claims  under  the  legal  bankruptcy  proceedings.  We 
also  describe  the  self-regulatory  practices  of  the 
nineteenth  century  American  clearinghouses,  which 
offered  depositors  a form  of private  deposit  insur- 
ance.  The  description  of private  financial  arrange- 
ments  provides  a  model  that  can  be  used  to  criti- 
cally evaluate  the  federal  system  of deposit  insurance 
and  regulation. 
Risk,  Market  Discipline,  and  Bankruptcy 
The  contemporary  view  of the  modern  business 
firm emphasizes  the  diverse  interests  of the  different 
parties  participating  in  the  operation  of the  organi- 
zation  (Coase  1937;  Alchian  1968;  Jensen  and 
Meckling  1976;  Fama  1980;  Fama  and Jensen  1983a, 
1983b).  Firms  are viewed  as a nexus  for a set  of con- 
tracting  relationships  among  different  economic 
agents.  This  “property  rights”  view  treats  suppliers 
of productive  inputs,  such as labor,  as well the holders 
of  financial  claims  (shareholders  and  creditors),  as 
stakeholders  whose  claims  against  the  firm  are 
governed  by  either  implicit  or  explicit  contractual 
arrangements.  The  managers  of a firm  constitute  a 
special type  of labor input responsible  for coordinating 
the  activities  of others  and executing  contracts  among 
suppliers  of productive  inputs. 
Most  large  organizations  are  characterized  by  a 
separation  of risk-bearing  and  decision-making.  Indi- 
viduals  who  bear  the  residual  risks  associated  with 
the  operation  of  an  organization  typically  delegate 
decision-making  responsibility  to  professional 
managers.  The  modern  business  corporation  provides 
the  most  familiar  example  of this  type  of organiza- 
tional  structure.  Corporate  managers  make  decisions 
for  the  firm,  taking  risks  whose  costs  are  borne  by 
shareholders  as well as others  with  a stake  in the firm. 
Since  managers  rarely  hold  a significantfraction  of 
corporate  equity,  they  do  not  bear  the  full  cost  of 
bad  decisions  nor reap  the  full benefits  of good  ones. 
Financial  mutuals  such  as  mutual  insurance  com- 
panies  and,  notably,  many  savings  and  loan  associ- 
ations,  are  also  characterized  by  a  separation  of 
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mutuals  accrue  to their  customers,  who therefore  bear 
the  residual  risks  stemming  from  the  operation  of 
those  organizations  (although  deposit  insurance  limits 
the  extent  to which  depositors  bear  residual  risks  at 
insured  savings  and  loans).  In  this  sense,  the 
policyholders  of  a  mutual  insurance  company  or 
depositors  in  a  mutual  savings  and  loan  can  be 
thought  of  as  “owners”  (Fama  and  Jensen  1983a, 
1983b). 
Since  managers  do  not  bear  the  full costs  result- 
ing  from  their  decisions,  their  interests  may  differ 
from  those  of shareholders  and  creditors.  To  ensure 
that  managers  have  incentives  to act  in the  interests 
of  shareholders,  large  firms  typically  rely  on  hier- 
archical  organizational  structures  to  monitor  and 
evaluate  performance.  A board  of directors  consisting 
in part  of individuals  outside  the  firm’s management 
hierarchy  evaluates  the  performance  of  its  senior 
management. 
Markets  play  an important  role  in providing  both 
managers  and  board  members  with  incentives  to act 
in  the  interests  of shareholders.  Managers  have  an 
incentive  to  acquire  a  reputation  for  effective  per- 
formance  to enhance  their  career  prospects.  Outside 
directors  often  sit on more  than  one  board  and  have 
an  incentive  to  discharge  their  duties  effectively  so 
as to secure  invitations  to join  other  boards  of direc- 
tors.  The  market  for corporate  control  also provides 
a powerful  incentive  for  corporate  boards  of direc- 
tors  and  managers  to  act  in  the  interests  of 
shareholders.  Poor  performance  by  management  is 
often  reflected  in  a  corporation’s  share  price, 
making  the  organization  susceptible  to  a  takeover 
from  another  management  team. 
For  financial  mutuals,  such  as  savings  and  loan 
associations  and  insurance  companies,  the  channels 
through  which  the  market  disciplines  the  firm’s 
decision-makers  are somewhat  different.  The  residual 
claims  of  mutuals  are  redeemable  on  demand  at  a 
price  determined  by  a prespecified  rule.  Thus,  the 
policyholders  of  a  mutual  insurance  company  can 
redeem  their  policies  before  they  mature  according 
to terms  specified  in the  policy.  Similarly,  depositors 
at  mutual  savings  and  loans  can  withdraw  their 
deposits,  receiving  the  amount  deposited  plus  the 
stated  interest.  In the  absence  of deposit  insurance, 
depositors  would  be expected  to withdraw  their funds 
upon  learning  that  the  association’s  management  had 
embarked  upon  a risky  and  imprudent  investment 
strategy.  As  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983a,  p.  317)  ex- 
plain,  “The  decision  of a claim  holder  to  withdraw 
resources  is a form  of partial  takeover  or liquidation 
which  deprives  management  of control  over  assets.” 
The  role  of risk-bearing  is most  often  associated 
with  the  shareholders  of a firm,  but  the  limited  lia- 
bility feature  of common  equity  imposes  some  of the 
residual  risk  on  a  firm’s  other  stakeholders,  most 
notably  its  creditors.  Private  lending  arrangements 
reflect  a recognition  on  the  part  of lenders  that  the 
borrowers  can  potentially  benefit  by  undertaking 
actions  that  shift  risk  to  the  lender  after  a  loan  is 
made.  A borrowing  firm can  effectively  transfer  risk 
to lenders  by siphoning  off assets  to the  stockholders 
through  excessive  dividend  payments,  by increasing 
the  riskiness  of the  business,  or by pledging  its assets 
to  another  creditor. 
For  this  reason,  the  extension  of  credit  is  often 
accompanied  by a legally binding  agreement  limiting 
the  uses  of borrowed  funds.  Banks  typically  extend 
credit  only after gathering  extensive  information  about 
the  borrowing  firm, and typically  continue  to monitor 
the  activities  of  borrowing  firms  after  funds  are 
disbursed  (Stiglitz  1985).  Other  creditors,  such  as 
outside  bondholders,  commonly  require  covenants 
limiting  the  actions  of the  borrowing  firm.  In  addi- 
tion  to  restricting  the  use  of the  borrower’s  assets, 
such  “bonding”  agreements  typically  require  the  bor- 
rower  to  disclose  certain  events  to  the  lender  and 
may provide  for direct  supervision  of the  borrower’s 
business  by  the  lender  (Black,  Miller,  and  Posner 
1978).  Legal  bankruptcy  proceedings  provide  the 
ultimate  means  of enforcing  the  interests  of creditors 
by alleviating  important  incentive  problems  that  arise 
when  a firm  is  insolvent  or  nearing  insolvency. 
When  shareholders  hold  a  substantial  stake  in  a 
firm  they  bear  much  of the  residual  risk  stemming 
from  its  activities.  But  once  shareholder  equity  is 
dissipated,  the  limited  liability  feature  of  common 
stock  makes  added  risk-taking  consistent  with  the 
interest  of  shareholders.  Under  such  conditions  a 
risky  investment  strategy  may  actually  benefit 
shareholders  because  even  a small  probability  of  a 
large  gain  can  result  in  large  residual  profits  and 
restore  the  firm  to  solvency,  while  any  losses  stem- 
ming  from  such  a  strategy  are  borne  by  creditors. 
At the  same  time,  the threat  of pending  bankruptcy 
can  affect  the  incentives  faced  by  the  managers  of 
the  firm.  Managers  advance  their  careers  by demon- 
strating  competence  at coordinating  the  activities  of 
firms.  While  the  insolvency  of a firm need  not always 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  5 be  due  to managerial  incompetence,  bankruptcy  pro- 
ceedings  typically  damage  the  career  prospects  of a 
fum’s managers.  Thus,  the  managers  of a failing firm 
may perceive  themselves  as having  little to lose from 
pursuing  a strategy  of excessive  risk-taking,  viewing 
it as the  only  opportunity  left  to  rescue  the  firm  as 
well as their  reputations.  For  these  reasons,  creditor3 
typically  seek  to take  control  of a firm away from  its 
existing  management  at the  first  sign  of insolvency. 
The  Resolution  of  Claims  Under 
Bankruptcy  Laws 
Legal  bankruptcy  proceeding3  can  be  initiated 
by  the  management  of  a debtor  firm  as  well  as  by 
its  creditors.  A firm  can  be  forced  into  legal  bank- 
ruptcy  proceedings  by  its  creditors  when  it can  no 
longer  meet  its  debt  obligations  as they  come  due, 
or when  it violates  certain  debt  covenants.  In prac- 
tice,  bankruptcy  proceedings  are  often  initiated  by 
a firm’s management  when  default is imminent.  When 
a  firm  files  for  protection  from  its  creditors  under 
Chapter  11 of the.Bankruptcy  Code,  its management 
nominally  retains  control  of  the  organization.  But 
although  management  remains  responsible  for super- 
vising  the  day-to-day  operation  of the  firm,  its deci- 
sions  are  subject  to judicial  review  and  approval  by 
creditors.  Creditor  committees  form  to  oversee  the 
operations  of a firm.  As  Todd  (1986)  notes,  these 
creditor  committees  hold  the  real power  over  all im- 
portant  operating  decisions.  In  effect,  the  creditor 
committees  become  co-managers  of  the  bankrupt 
firm,  with  their  legal  representative3  meeting  fre- 
quently  with  management.  A. trustee  may  be  ap- 
pointed  to administer  the  operations  of the  bankrupt 
firm  if there  is  evidence  of fraudulent  behavior  on 
the  part  of  management. 
A  firm  need  not  be  insolvent  to  file  a voluntary 
petition  for Chapter  11 protection  from  its creditors. 
Modern  bankruptcy  law provide3  for the  rehabilita- 
tion  of  debtors.  The  idea  behind  Chapter  11  pro- 
ceedings  is  to  effect  a reorganization  of financially 
troubled  firms  where  possible.  Once  a bankruptcy 
petition  is filed,  the  firm is granted  an automatic  stay 
permitting  it  to  stop  payment3  to  its  unsecured 
creditors.  Secured  creditors  are  prohibited  from 
taking  possession  of  property  from  the  bankrupt’s 
estate  unless  they  can obtain  relief from the  automatic 
stay.  In cases  where  the  bankruptcy  judge  deems  the 
property  securing  a loan to be  necessary  for the  con- 
tinued  operation  of a bankrupt  organization,  a secured 
creditor  may  be  effectively  forced  to  renew  an  ex- 
tension  of  credit  to  the  bankrupt  firm. 
The  management  of  a  firm  in  Chapter  11  pro- 
ceedings  is  given  an  opportunity  to  draw  up  a 
reorganization  plan  specifying  a new  financial  struc- 
ture  along  with  a  revised  repayment  schedule  for 
outstanding  debts.  Creditor3  are  sometimes  called 
upon  to  forgive  a portion  of the  firm’s  debt  to  en- 
sure  the  viability  of the  reorganized  firm.  They  may 
agree  to  such  a  restructuring  of  the  firm’s  debts  if 
it seem3  likely  to yield  a greater  repayment  than  the 
amount  that  could  be realized  under  any other  course 
of  action,  including  liquidation. 
If  a  firm’s  management  does  not  offer  it3  own 
reorganization  plan,  or  cannot  produce  a  plan  ac- 
ceptable  to  creditors  and  to  the  bankruptcy  judge, 
creditors  can  propose  an  alternative  reorganization 
plan.  The  creditors’  plan  may  call for a new  manage- 
ment  team  to  be  installed. 
A bankruptcy  judge  acts  as a mediator  or referee 
between  management  and  the  different  parties  with 
claims  against  the  firm.  Judicial  decisions  are  gov- 
erned  by  a set  of Bankruptcy  Rule3  (See  Treister, 
et  al.  1988).  If creditors  cannot  agree  on a reorgani- 
zation  plan,  the  bankruptcy  judge  may  under  certain 
circumstances  impose  a reorganization  plan.  In Some 
cases  the  court  may  order  the  liquidation  of  a 
bankrupt  firm. 
Liquidation  of  a  bankrupt  firm’s  assets  is  gov- 
erned  by  Chapter  7 of the  bankruptcy  code.  When 
a  firm  enters  Chapter  7  proceedings,  a  trustee  is 
appointed  to  legally  represent  and  administer  the 
estate.  The  Bankruptcy  Code  establishes  a schedule 
of priorities  for the  distribution  of liquidation  proceeds 
among  unsecured  creditors.  Administrative  expenses 
of managing  the  bankrupt’3  estate  receive  first prior- 
ity.  Unpaid  wages  and  benefits,  up to a certain  limit 
come  next,  followed  by claims  of governmental  units 
for taxes,  customs  duties,  and accrued  penalties.  The 
claims  of  holders  of  investment  securities  are  sub- 
ordinate  to  all  other  unsecured  creditors.  Thus, 
holders  of subordinated  debt,  which  includes  bond 
and note  holders,  are reimbursed  only after the  claims 
of  all  other  unsecured  creditors  are  satisfied.  Pre- 
ferred  shareholders  are  next,  with  common  equity 
shareholders  receiving  lowest  priority.  Secured 
creditors  are not  subject  to the  schedule  of priorities  I 
(Todd  1986;  Treister,  et  al.  1988,  chapter  6). 
To  summarize,  private  lenders  employ  a number 
of strategies,  including  loan  covenants,  monitoring, 
and bankruptcy  proceedings  when  necessary,  to pro- 
tect  their  claims  against  a borrowing  firm.  Although 
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do  help  to  limit  losses  when  a  borrower  becomes 
financially  distressed. 
Private  Regulation  of  Commercial  Banking 
Today,  regulation  is most  often viewed  as a govern- 
mental  activity.  However,  private  regulatory  organi- 
zations  often  evolve  to  provide  for  the  orderly 
functioning  of  market  activity  in  the  absence  of 
government  intervention.  Notable  examples  of 
private  regulation  include  the  futures  and  securities 
exchanges,  which  evolved  as purely  private  organi- 
zations  formed  to set  and  enforce  trading  rules.  The 
nineteenth  century  American  commercial  bank  clear- 
inghouses,  which  essentially  regulated  a significant 
part  of the  banking  industry  before  the  advent  of the 
Federal  Reserve,  provide  another  example  of private 
regulation.  These  clearinghouses  provided  an  in- 
formal  system  of deposit  insurance  to  depositors  at 
member  banks.  The  historical  lessons  offered  by the 
operation  of the  clearinghouse  system  therefore  seem 
relevant  to  the  study  of  deposit  insurance  reform, 
and  the  system  merits  comparison  with  present-day 
deposit  insurance  arrangements. 
Commercial  bank  clearinghouses  were  first  orga- 
nized  to conserve  on the  transactions  costs  associated 
with  clearing  checks.  Banks,  as  organizations  that 
specialized  in information-intensive  loans  based  on 
the  evaluation  of the  creditworthiness  of individuals, 
had  a  natural  advantage  in  monitoring  the  credit- 
worthiness  of other  banks.  Moreover,  their  need  to 
exchange  checks  with  other  banks  gave  them  an 
incentive  to  engage  in  some  form  of  monitoring. 
Thus,  the  clearinghouses  developed  into  a form  of 
private  regulatory  agency. 
Because  private  regulatory  arrangements  are 
based  on the  premise  that  participation  is motivated 
by self-interest,  the  most  common  penalty  for failure 
to  abide  by  the  rules  is expulsion  from  the  system. 
Thus,  futures  and  securities  traders  who  systemati- 
cally  violate  trading  rules  are  banned  from  trading 
on the  exchanges.  Likewise,  the  early clearinghouses 
denied  access  to banks  that  failed to meet  the  finan- 
cial  standards  established  by  the  clearinghouse 
member  banks. 
As  a prominent  example  of  how  such  regulation 
was  effected  in  practice,  Gorton  and  Mullineaux 
(1987)  describe  the operations  of the New  York clear- 
inghouse.  Admission  to  the  clearinghouse  required 
banks  to meet  an admissions  test  that  required  banks 
to  be  well-capitalized  and  to  submit  to  periodic 
examinations.  In  times  of panic,  the  clearinghouse 
organized  suspensions  of deposit  convertibility  and 
issued  loan  certificates  to  member  banks  that  they 
could  use  in the  clearing  process  in place  of specie. 
Through  the  issue  of such  loan  certificates,  member 
banks  essentially  pooled  their  resources  to  assure 
depositors  of the ultimate  safety of individual member 
bank  liabilities.  In effect,  the  clearinghouse  insured 
the  deposits  of  its  member  banks  through  this 
mechanism. 
Such  pooling  arrangements  exposed  clearinghouse 
members  to the  threat  of losses  if a bank  proved  in- 
solvent.  Clearinghouse  members  therefore  had  an 
incentive  to ensure  that  only  sound  banks  were  part 
of the  clearinghouse.  To  this end,  the  clearinghouses 
closely  monitored  member  banks  and expelled  those 
that  did  not  satisfy  rigorous  standards. 
Denial  of access  to the  clearinghouse  made  it much 
more  difficult  and  costly  for  banks  to  clear  checks, 
so  the  threat  of  expulsion  provided  banks  with  a 
strong  incentive  to  conform  to  clearinghouse  rules. 
Moreover,  expulsion  was  a signal  that  the  banking 
community  had  determined  that  there  was  a  high 
probability  that  the  affected  bank  would  not  be  able 
to meet  its deposit  obligations.  Thus,  clearinghouses 
became  credible  suppliers  of information  about  the 
financial  condition  of  member  banks. 
On  balance,  the  nineteenth  century  clearinghouses 
appear  to  have  functioned  as  effective  private 
regulatory  organizations.  Available  evidence  indicates 
that the ultimate  losses suffered  by depositors  of failed 
banks  during  this period  were  negligible  (Timberlake 
1984).  Despite  its  effectiveness  in this  regard,  this 
private  system  of  regulation  was  replaced  with 
government  regulation  with  the  formation  of  the 
Federal  Reserve,  and,  after  the  collapse  of  the 
banking  system  in  the  early  1930.5, with  federally 
sponsored  deposit  insurance. 
The  Federal  Reserve  System  was  created  to 
impose  greater  centralized  government  control  over 
the  banking  system  (Timberlake  1984).  Under  the 
clearinghouse  system  there  were  recurrent  financial 
panics  and.bank  suspensions  that  were  viewed  as a 
source  of  macroeconomic  instability.’  In  addition, 
there  was some  concern  that  the  clearinghouse  struc- 
ture  led  to  industry  cartelization  and  monopoly 
1 The  assertion  that  banking  panics  have  been  a primary  cause 
of macroeconomic  instability  in U.S.  economic  history  has  been 
disputed  by recent  research,  however  (see  Benston,  et al.  1986, 
chapter  ‘2). 
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clearinghouse  members  the  potential  ability  to limit 
entry  into  their  markets. 
Yet,  it is worth  emphasizing  again  that  the  clear- 
inghouse  system  actually worked  quite well at limiting 
depositor  losses.  Moreover,  demands  for  greater 
governmental  control  over  monetary  policy  and  con- 
cerns  over  macroeconomic  instability,  while justified, 
do  not  necessarily  provide  an  argument  in favor  of 
government  regulation  of  banking.  As  Goodfriend 
and  King (1988)  point  out,  the  exercise  of monetary 
policy  only requires  a central  monetary  authority  em- 
powered  to carry  out  open  market  operations.  Thus, 
monetary  policy should  be able to prevent  widespread 
bank  suspensions  30  long  as the  monetary  authority 
stands  willing  to  supply  reserves  to  stabilize  the 
relative  price  of currency  and bank  liabilities.  To  the 
extent  that  preventing  financial panics  and bank  runs 
is perceived  as  an  important  goal  of public  policy, 
available evidence  suggests  that  liberalizing  regulatory 
restrictions  that  limit the  ability  of banks  to establish 
branches  would  be  the  most  effective  solution 
(Calomiris  1989b).  Finally,  in  the  area  of  antitrust 
concerns,  existing  antitrust  laws  should  be  adequate 
to guard  against  anticompetitive  behavior  in the  bank- 
ing  system.2 
Deposit  Insurance  and 
Bank  Failure  Resolution 
Because  a  deposit  insurer  effectively  becomes  a 
creditor  to banks  and thrifts,  a system  of government 
regulation  and  supervision  is a necessary  adjunct  to 
a system  of government-sponsored  deposit  insurance. 
Government  regulation  and  supervision  in  this  in- 
stance  is analogous  to  the  monitoring  behavior  and 
other  protective  devices  employed  by  creditors  in 
private  financial  arrangements.  The  scope  of  this 
regulatory  system  is comprehensive  and  extends  to 
legal  arrangements  for  dealing  with  bank  and  thrift 
failures,  which  differ  from  bankruptcy  proceedings 
for  nonfinancial  firms. 
Commercial  banks  and  savings  and  loan  associ- 
ations,  along  with  certain  other  heavily  regulated 
financial  firms  such  as insurance  companies,  are  not 
subject  to  the  bankruptcy  laws  that  apply  to  com- 
mercial  firms.  Responsibility  for closing  an insolvent 
bank  or  savings  and  loan  rests  with  its  chartering 
agency.  In  the  case  of national  banks,  the  charter- 
2  Kuprianov  (1985)  gives  an  account  of  how  antitrust  laws 
assured  savings  and  loans  access  to  the  Automated  Clearing 
Houses  operated  by  the  commercial  banking  industry. 
ing  agency  is  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of the 
Currency  (OCC).  Before  being  disbanded  in  1989, 
the Federal  Home  Loan  Bank Board chartered  federal 
savings  and  loan  associations.  The  Bank  Board’s 
chartering  authority  has  since  been  delegated  to  a 
new  agency,  the  Office  of Thrift  Supervision  (OTS). 
In  addition  to  the  federal  chartering  agencies,  each 
state  also charters  commercial  banks  and savings  and 
loan  associations.  The  state  banking  or savings  and 
loan superintendents  are responsible  for closing  state- 
chartered  institutions. 
Roie of th  deposit  insurer  When  an  insured  bank 
or thrift is declared  insolvent,  the  deposit  insurer  pays 
off insured  depositors  and,  in most  cases,  becomes 
the  receiver  for  the  failed  institution.3  Once  the 
insured  depositors  are  paid,  the  deposit  insurer 
assumes  their  claims  against  the  failed  institution. 
Thus,  the  role  of the  deposit  insurer  in dealing  with 
a failing bank  or savings  and loan differs considerably 
from  that  of a bankruptcy  judge  or  trustee.  Rather 
than  acting  solely  in the  role  of a mediator  between 
different  claimants,  as a bankruptcy  judge  does,  the 
deposit  insurer  assumes  the  dual role of receiver  and 
claimant. 
As  receiver,  the  deposit  insurer  assumes  respon- 
sibility  for  administering  the  assets  of the  insolvent 
firm  and  has  a  fiduciary  responsibility  to  all  other 
claimants,  such  as  uninsured  depositors  and  non- 
deposit  creditors.  In its role as a claimant,  the  deposit 
insurer  attempts  to secure  repayment  of deposits  from 
the  failed institution  on behalf  of insured  depositors. 
Federal  banking  law  does  not  grant  the  deposit  in- 
surer  preference  over  other  unsecured  creditors, 
although  some  states  have  enacted  “depositor 
preference”  statutes  (Hirschhorn  and  Zervos  1990). 
The  law gives the  deposit  insurer  substantial  discre- 
tion in dealing  with  a failing institution.  Nevertheless, 
the  insurer  must  seek  the  cooperation  of  other 
creditors  when  attempting  to reorganize  and restruc- 
ture  the  debts  of an insolvent  bank.  Although  com- 
mercial  bank  and  savings  and  loan  failures  are  not 
subject  to  the  same  kind  of stringent  judicial  over- 
3  In  the  past,  the  FSLIC  bore  responsibility  for administering 
federally  insured  savings  and  loan  institutions  when  they  were 
declared  insolvent.  However,  with  the  enactment  of FIRREA, 
the  FSLIC  was  dissolved  and  the  FDIC  was  given  responsi- 
bility  for  administering  both  the  Bank  Insurance  Fund  (BIF), 
which  insures  the  deposits  of  commercial  banks,  and  the 
Savings  Association  Insurance  Fund  (SAIF),  the  new  deposit 
insurance  fund  for savings  and  loans.  In its  new  role,  the  FDIC 
is  responsible  for  handling  insolvent  savings  and  loans  as  well 
as  commercial  bank  failures. 
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feel they  have  been  treated  unfairly  do have  recourse 
to  the  courts. 
FSLJCfaihn  ‘RFOlution~rvct&r~~~  Before it became 
insolvent  and was itself dissolved,  the  FSLIC  enjoyed 
a large  degree  of discretion  in the  way  it dealt  with 
failing  savings  and  loans.  It  could:  [ 11 liquidate.  the 
organization  and  pay  off  its  depositors  and  other 
creditors;  [Z] reorganize  the  enterprise  and  return  it 
to  private  sector  control;  or  [3]  extend  direct 
assistance  to enable  a troubled  institution  to remain 
in  operation. 
In  a  liquidation,  or  payout,  a failing  savings  and 
loan  would  be  closed,  its  insured  depositors  paid, 
and  its assets  liquidated.  Receivership  expenses  had 
first priority  against liquidation  proceeds,  with remain- 
ing proceeds  distributed  to the  association’s  creditors. 
In  states  with  depositor  preference  statutes,  the 
claims  of the  FSLIC  and  any  uninsured  depositors 
against  the failed institution  received  preference  over 
other  unsecured  creditors.  In states  with no depositor 
preference  statutes,  the  FSLIC  was  forced  to  share 
the  liquidation  proceeds  with  other  unsecured 
creditors.  Most  often,  a  troubled  savings  and  loan 
was not  closed  before  it had accumulated  large losses, 
so  that  liquidation  proceeds  rarely  covered  all out- 
standing  creditor  claims in full. Only  a relatively  small 
number  of failed  savings  and  loans  have  been  liqui- 
dated.  Between  1980  and  1988  only  78  of the  489 
insolvencies  officially  resolved  by  the  FSLIC  were 
liquidated.4 
In  reorganizing  a  failing  savings  and  loan,  the 
FSLIC  could:  [l]  directly  augment  the  net  worth  of 
the  enterprise,  either  through  direct  cash  contribu- 
tions or through  the  issue of its own promissory  notes; 
121  purchase  subordinated  debt  or preferred  stock  as 
part  of a recapitalization;  [3] provide  the  acquirer  of 
an insolvent  institution  with  financial  guarantees  and 
yield  maintenance  agreements  guaranteeing  the  per- 
formance  of  the  troubled  organization’s  assets;  or 
14) purchase  the  impaired  assets  of a troubled  institu- 
tion  at  a  negotiated  price  (Zisman  and  Churchill 
1989).  Thus,  the  FSLIC  sometimes  maintained  an 
explicit  financial  stake  in  an  institution  after  it was 
reorganized.  In  addition  to  directly  augmenting  the 
4  The  number  of official failure resolutions  understates  the  true 
number  of thrift  insolvencies  during  this  period.  Some  troubled 
institutions  were  handled  through  “supervisory  mergers,”  de- 
scribed  below,  while  hundreds  more  insolvent  institutions  have 
been  taken  over  by  regulators  but  have  not  yet  been  closed  or 
reorganized.  Barth,  Bartholomew,  and  Bradley  (1989b)  give data 
on  thrift  failure  resolutions  and  costs  from  1934  to  1988. 
net  worth  of a troubled  institution  in these  ways,  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  which  administered 
the  FSLIC,  would  often  grant  acquirers  of troubled 
thrifts  special  permission  to  acquire  other  institu- 
tions  at  a  later  date.  To  augment  the  franchise 
value  of financially  troubled  institutions,  the  Bank 
Board  sometimes  provided  acquirers  with  enhanced 
branching  opportunities  or  permission  to  acquire 
healthy  savings  and loans  in other  states,  actions  that 
state-mandated  branching  restrictions  would  other- 
wise  prohibit. 
Reorganizations  of  troubled  thrifts  often  took 
the  form  of  a  stlperwirory  merger. In  a  supervisory 
merger,  regulators  would  arrange  the  merger  of  a 
financially  troubled  institution  with  another  institu- 
tion  deemed  to  be  in  better  financial  condition. 
Supervisory  mergers  were  accomplished  without  the 
explicit  financial  assistance  of  the  FSLIC.  Nor- 
mally,  the  FSLIC  would  have  been  expected  to 
recapitalize  a  failing  institution  before  arranging  a 
merger.  But as the  deposit  insurer’s financial resources 
became  strained,  the  Bank  Board was forced  to grant 
regulatory  forbearances  to arrange  mergers  of insol- 
vent  organizations.  In  some  cases,  regulatory  for- 
bearance  amounted  to  a  waiver  from  regulatory 
minimum  net  worth  requirements.  In  many  cases, 
however,  such  forbearances  involved  permission  to 
employ  liberal  accounting  procedures  that  autho- 
rized  the  acquirer  to  defer  recognition  of the  losses 
of  the  insolvent  thrift  almost  indefinitely.  Thus, 
supervisory  mergers  often  simply  consolidated  losses 
into  larger  organizations  that  were  permitted  to con- 
tinue  operating  without  private  capital.  Between  1980 
and  1988,  333  institutions  were  involved  in  super- 
visory  mergers  (Barth,  Bartholomew,  and  Bradley 
1989b,  Table  1). 
Since  supervisory  mergers  did not  require  explicit 
action on the part of the  FSLIC,  they  are not officially 
counted  as failure resolutions.  As Kane (1989b)  notes, 
however,  the  grant  of regulatory  forbearance  made 
the  FSLIC  the  residual  risk-bearer  for undercapital- 
ized  enterprises  that  would  otherwise  have  been 
unable  to attract  funding.  To  the  extent  that  super- 
visory  mergers  were  based  on promises  of regulatory 
forbearance,  the  FSLIC  maintained  an implicit equity 
stake  even  in  cases  where  its  stake  in  the  merged 
firms  was  not  made  explicit. 
The  Bank  Board  had  the  authority  to assume  con- 
trol of a financially troubled  organization  until it could 
be reorganized  and  sold to private  investors.  It exer- 
cised  such  “conservatorship”  powers  in its  Manage- 
ment  Consignment  Program,  which  is discussed  in 
greater  detail  in  Section  II. 
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authorized  to  extend  direct  assistance  to  a  finan- 
cially  troubled  institution  if  such  an  action,  was 
deemed  less  costly  than  any  of  the  other  available 
courses  of action,  or  in cases  where  the  institution 
was judged  to be “vital”  to its community  (Benston, 
et  al.  1986,  chapter  4). 
Ostensibly,  then,  FSLIC  failure  resolution  pro- 
cedures  resemble  legal  bankruptcy  proceedings,  in 
that  they  are  meant  to  bring  about  the  reorganiza- 
tion  of a failing  firm  or provide  for  its  liquidation  in 
cases where  reorganization  is not deemed  worthwhile. 
In practice,  however,  the  savings  and loan regulatory 
system  has  proved  ineffective  at limiting  the  losses 
incurred  by  insolvent  institutions.  Whereas  legal 
bankruptcy  proceedings  ensure  that ,the  debts  of an 
insolvent  firm  are  restructured  in  such  a  way  that 
shareholders  have  an equity  stake  before  the  firm  is 
returned  to private  control,  the  same  has  not  always 
been  true  of  FSLIC  failure, resolution  procedures. 
Moreover,  the  system  proved  ineffective  at curbing 
the  risks  taken  on  by  the  management  of  failing 
institutions.  The  practical  importance  of these  dif- 
ferences  will become  evident  in the  ensuing  account 
of  the  evolution  of  the  savings  and  loan  crisis. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE 
SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 
The  origins  of the  savings  and loan crisis are rooted 
in the  system  of regulation  imposed  on the  industry. 
The  ensuing  account  describes  the  evolution  of the 
system  and  highlights  the  characteristics  that  later 
precipitated  an industry-wide  crisis. We then  proceed 
to  a  detailed  account  of  the  crisis  itself. 
Federal  Regulation  of  Savings  and  Loans 
The  savings  and  loan  regulatory  system  of  the 
1980s  was a product  of legislation  enacted  during  the 
Great  Depression.  Before  1932,  the  federal  govern- 
ment  had  little  involvement  in  thrift  regulation. 
Savings  and  loans  shared  in the  financial  distress  that 
afflicted  commercial  banks  during  this  episode.  In 
an  attempt  to  assist  the  thrift  industry,  which  had 
begun  to contract  due  to heavy  deposit  withdrawals, 
Congress  passed  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Act 
in  1932.  The  Act  created  the  twelve  Federal  Home 
Loan  Banks  and the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank Board 
as  their  supervisory  agent.  The  goal  of this  legisla- 
tion  was  to provide  thrifts  with  an alternative  source 
of funding  for home  mortgage  lending,  much  in the 
same  way  that  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  provided 
temporary  funding  for commercial  banks.  While  the 
Federal  Reserve  Banks  only  provided  short-term 
credit,  however,  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Banks  were 
created  to  provide  longer-term  credit  in  support  of 
mortgage  lending. 
The  federal  government  became  involved  in 
chartering  savings  and loans  for the  first time  in 1933 
with  the  passage  of  the  Home  Owners’  Loan  Act, 
which  authorized  the  FHLBB  to charter  and regulate 
savings  and  loan  associations.  In  1934,  a year  after 
a  system  of  deposit  insurance  was  established  for 
commercial  banks,  the National  Housing  Act of 1934 
created  a deposit  insurance  fund  for savings  and loan 
associations.  Unlike  the  FDIC,  which  was established 
as  an  independent  organization  separate  from  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  and the  Comptroller  of the 
Currency,,  the  FSLIC  was placed  under  the  auspices 
of  the  FHLBB. 
The  legislation  creating  the  FSLIC  called  for  the 
establishment  of a reserve  fund  equal  to five percent 
of all insured  accounts  and creditor  obligations  within 
20, years,  and  empowered  the  agency  to  assess  an 
annual  insurance  deposit  of  l/4  of  one  percent  on 
the  total  deposits  of insured  S&Ls.  The  FSLIC  was 
further  authorized  to  collect  an  additional  emer- 
gency  assessment  of  l/4  percent  if it needed  addi- 
tional  funding.  At  first,  deposits  were  insured  up  to 
a  maximum  of  $5,000  per  depositor. 
When  federal  deposit  insurance  was  first  estab- 
lished,  both  the  FDIC  and the  FSLIC  were  expected 
to accumulate  and  hold  reserves  sufficient  to pay  off 
all insured  depositors  under  any  foreseeable  circum- 
stances.  The  legislated  deposit  insurance  assessments 
and  reserve  fund  targets  were  based  on estimates  of 
the  historical  losses  of depositors.  But federal  deposit 
insurance  had  not  been  in existence  long  before  the 
deposit  insurance  assessments  were  cut and coverage 
expanded.  In  1935,  a  year  after  the  FSLIC  was 
established,  statutory  deposit  insurance  assessments 
for  insured  savings  and  loans  were  cut  in  half,  to 
l/8  of  one  percent  of  deposits.  The  emergency 
assessment  authority  was  similarly  cut  to  l/8  of one 
percent.  That  same  year,  the  FDIC’s  assessments 
were  cut from  l/2  of one  percent  to  l/12  of one  per- 
cent,  and  its  emergency  assessment  rights  were 
rescinded. 
The  argument  for lowering  deposit  insurance  rates 
was  based  upon  the  assertion  that  enhanced  regula- 
tion  and  supervision  would  keep  future  losses  of 
insured  banks  below  the  historical  averages.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  there  appears  to  have  been 
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assessments  could  result  in future  funding  problems 
for  the  deposit  insurance  funds.  FDIC  deposit  in- 
surance  assessments  were  reduced  to  l! 12 of one per- 
cent  by  the  Banking  Act  of  1935,  which  also  pro- 
vided  the  agency  with  the  right  to  borrow  from  the 
U.S.  Treasury.  The  FSLIC  was granted  similar  bor- 
rowing  authority  in  1950,  when  deposit  insurance 
assessments  for  S&Ls  were  cut  to  1112  of  one 
percent. 
Over  the  ensuing  years,  basic  insurance  coverage 
for  S&L  depositors  was  raised  several  times:  to 
$15,000  in 1966,  $20,000  in 1969,  $40,000  in 1974, 
and,  most  recently,  to $100,000  in  1980.  These  in- 
creases  in coverage,  together  with  a rapid  growth  in 
deposits  throughout  most  of the  postwar  period,  far 
outpaced  the  accumulation  of reserves  in the  FSLIC 
insurance  fund.  The  five percent  reserve  fund  target 
originally mandated  by the National  Housing  Act was 
never  attained.  The  FSLIC’s  primary  reserve  fund 
never  exceeded  two  percent  of  insured  deposits 
(Barth,  Feid,  Riedel,  and  Tunis  1989). 
Thus,  historical  data  on bank  losses  suggests  that 
neither  deposit  insurance  fund  has had  the  necessary 
reserves  to deal with  the  contingency  of widespread 
bank  failures.  Both  the  FDIC  and  the  FSLIC  have 
faced  a chance  of insolvency  almost  since  their  in- 
ception.  Moreover,  both  agencies  received  the 
authority  to  borrow  from  the  U.S.  Treasury  as part 
of legislated  reductions  in deposit  insurance  rates  and 
increases  in  deposit  insurance  coverage.  As  Barth, 
Bradley,  and  Feid  (1989)  note,  however,  no formal 
procedures  were  ever  established  for dealing  with the 
insolvency  of one of the deposit  insurance  funds,  even 
though  the  funds  were  structured  in a way  to  make 
such  a  contingency  distinctly  possible,  if  not  in- 
evitable.  Thus,  the  stage  for the  present-day  savings 
and  loan  crisis  was  set  as  early  as  1950. 
Origins  of  the  Savings  and  Loan  Crisis 
The  first signs of trouble  surfaced  in the mid  196Os, 
when  rising  inflation  and  high  interest  rates  created 
funding  problems  for savings  and  loans.  Regulations 
prohibited  federally  insured  savings  and  loans  from 
diversifying  portfolios  that  were  concentrated  in long- 
term,  fixed-rate  mortgages.  Thrift  industry  profit- 
ability  eroded  as deposit  rates  crept  above  the  rates 
of return  provided  by thgir  existing  holdings  of home 
mortgage  loans.  Congress  attempted  to address  the 
problem  by  placing  a ceiling  on  maximum  deposit 
rates  paid  by  thrifts  in  1966.  Thrifts  were  given  a 
slight competitive  advantage,  being  authorized  to pay 
114 of  one  percent  more  on  savings  deposits  than 
commercial  banks  were  allowed  to pay,  to encourage 
deposit  flows  to  the  industry. 
But  interest  rate  controls  led  to  periods  of 
disintermediation  whenever  market  interest  rates  rose 
too  far  above  statutory  deposit  rate  ceilings.  The 
problem  became  increasingly  severe  as the  inflation 
and accompanying  high  interest  rates  that  character- 
ized  the  economic  environment  of  the  late  1970s 
made  the  existing  system  of  interest  rate  controls 
unworkable.  Misguided  regulation  was blamed  for the 
thrift industry’s  woes,  and lawmakers  began  to debate 
the  merits  of  financial  deregulation. 
The  first  significant  step  to  deregulate  the  thrift 
industry  came  in  1980  with  the  passage  of  the 
Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and  Monetary 
Control  Act  (DIDMCA).  The  DIDMCA  provided 
for  the  phase-out  of  interest  rate  regulations  and 
permitted  thrifts  to diversify  their  asset  portfolios  to 
include  consumer  loans  other  than  mortgage  loans, 
loans  based  on  commercial  real  estate,  commercial 
paper,  and  corporate  debt  securities.  The  act  also 
raised the limit on federal  deposit  insurance  applicable 
to  individual  accounts  from  $40,000  to  $100,000. 
This  first  attempt  at  deregulation  came  too  late 
to  help  thrifts  cope  with  the  steep  rise  in  interest 
rates  that  began  in  1981  and  continued  into  1982. 
Federally  chartered  S&Ls  were  not  given  the  legal 
authority  to make  variable-rate  mortgage  loans  until 
1979,  and then  only under  severe  restrictions.  They 
did  not  receive  the  authority  to  freely  negotiate 
variable-rate  mortgage  loans  with  borrowers  until 
198 1. By that time,  deposit  rates had risen well above 
the  rates  most  institutions  were  earning  on  their 
outstanding  fixed-rate  mortgage  loans.  As  funding 
costs  rose,  many  thrifts  experienced  heavy  losses. 
Federally  insured  savings  and  loans  collectively  lost 
over  $4.6  billion  in  1981  and  $4.1  billion  in  1982.5 
By  one  estimate,  8.5  percent  of  all  thrifts  were 
unprofitable  in  198 1, and  most  were  insolvent  on an 
economic  basis  (Barth,  Bartholomew,  and  Labich 
1989).  From  the  start  of  1980  through  year-end 
1982, the  number  of FSLIC-insured  thrifts fell almost 
20  percent,  from  3,993  to  3,287. 
s  Net  operating  income,  which  more  accurately  reflects  the  true 
losses  suffered  by  thrifts  during  this  period  because  it excludes 
nonrecurring  gains,  presents  an  even  more  devastating  picture 
of  losses  suffered  bv  savings  and  loans  durine  this  neriod. 
According  to  Barth,  Bartholomew,  and  Bradley  0989,  kppen- 
dix  I-8),  aggregate  net  operating  income  for  the  U.S.  thrift 
industry  in  1981 was  -$7.1  billion  and  -$8.8  billion  for  1982. 
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resources  of the  FSLIC.  Hundreds  more  institutions 
that  had  become  economically  insolvent  were  not 
closed  because  the  FSLIC  lacked  the  resources  to 
deal with  them.  Many  economically  insolvent  thrifts 
were  able  to  maintain  the  appearance  of  solvency 
even  though  they  were  economically  insolvent 
because  generally  accepted  accounting  practices 
(GAAP)  permitted  them  to  report  their  net  worth 
based  on  historical  asset  value,, instead  of requiring 
them  to  recognize  the  true  market  value  of assets. 
But  as interest  rates  continued  to  rise,  a significant 
number  of  institutions  soon  accumulated  such 
massive  losses  that  some  action  was  required.  The 
FSLIC  resolved  32  thrift  insolvencies  in  1980, 
another  82  in  1981,  and  247  in  1982.  During  the 
same  period,  another  493  savings  and  loans  volun- 
tarily  merged  with  other  institutions  (Barth,  Bar- 
tholomew,  and  Bradley  1989b,  Table  1). In spite  of 
this  record-breaking  caseload,  Kane  (1989b) 
estimates  that  237  FSLIC-insured  thrifts  were 
GAAP-insolvent  at  the  end  of  1982.  The  number 
of insolvent  insured  thrifts  in operation  continued  to 
climb  through  1988. 
Regulatory  Forbearance 
Once  the  crisis  in  the  savings  and  loan  industry 
had  begun,  it was  perpetuated  by  policies  of  regu- 
latory  forbearance,  which  permitted  insolvent  institu- 
tions to remain  open  in the  hope  that  they  could grow 
out  of their  financial  problems.  The  policies  adopted 
to  deal  with  the  growing  number  of  insolvent  sav- 
ings and loans  during  this episode  stand  in stark  con- 
trast  to  the  restrictions  on  management  typically 
imposed  in  the  course  of  legal  bankruptcy  pro- 
ceedings  for  nonfinancial  firms. 
FHLBBpohiis  Lacking  the  resources  to deal with 
all the  problem  institutions  under  its supervision,  the 
Bank  Board  adopted  a policy  of regulatory  forbear- 
ance.  Minimum  net  worth  requirements  were 
lowered  in  1980  and  1982.  Regulatory  accounting 
principles  (RAP)  were  liberalized  in  198 1, and  again 
in  1982,  to  permit  distressed  savings  and  loans  to 
defer  recognizing  their  losses.  These  permissive  rules 
encouraged  thrifts  to record  inflated  net  worth  values 
so as to present  an appearance  of solvency.  Together, 
lenient  net  worth  requirements  and  permissive 
regulatory  accounting  principles  lowered  the  number 
of  official  “problem”  institutions  the  overburdened 
Bank  Board  staff  was  forced  to  deal  with,  although 
only  for  a  short  time  (Brumbaugh  1988). 
By this  time,  many  thrifts  had  accumulated  such 
large  losses  that  even  these  new  and  permissive 
accounting  rules  could  not  conceal  the  fact that  they 
were  insolvent.  Concerned  that  acknowledging  the 
large  number  of  insolvent  savings  and  loans  could 
bring  about  a crisis  of confidence  among  depositors, 
the  FHLBB  implemented  its income-capital  certifi- 
cates  (ICC)  program.  Under  this  program,  insolvent 
thrifts  could  issue  income  capital  certificates  to  the 
FSLIC  to supplement  their regulatory  net worth.  The 
idea  behind  the  program  was  for the  FSLIC  to pur- 
chase  the  certificates  to restore  troubled  institutions 
to solvency.  Because  the  FSLIC  lacked  the  money, 
it  most  often  exchanged  its  own  promissory  notes 
for  the  certificates.  Institutions  receiving  such 
promissory  notes  could  include  them  on their  balance 
sheets  as assets,  while income  capital certificates  were 
reported  as  an  equity  item.  Such  transactions 
amounted  to  the  purchase  of equity  in an  insolvent 
enterprise  by  the  FSLIC  using  its  own  credit. 
Income-capital  certificates  gave  the  FSLIC  a finan- 
cial interest  in these  troubled  thrifts.  If participating 
institutions  eventually  regained  profitability,  as it was 
hoped  they  would,  the  income-capital  certificates 
would  entitle  the  FSLIC  to  a share  of their  profits. 
But  in  the  event  a  participating  institution  was 
declared  insolvent,  the  FSLIC  had  virtually  no 
chance  of  regaining  its  investment.  FSLIC  claims 
based  on income  capital  certificates  were  subordinate 
not  only  to  the  claims  of  depositors,  but  of  other 
creditors  as  wel16 
Where  possible,  the  FSLIC  used  income-capital 
certificates  to facilitate  mergers  and  reorganizations. 
Prospective  buyers  were  hesitant  to  assume  the 
liabilities  of insolvent  thrifts  when  it  appeared  that 
the  value  of the  institutions’  assets  fell  far  short  of 
deposit  obligations.  Sometimes,  the  FSLIC  trans- 
ferred  assets  from  thrifts  it  was  in  the  process  of 
liquidating  to  other  institutions  it was  trying  to  sell. 
This  latter  course  was  typically  pursued  where  pur- 
chasers  of insolvent  thrifts  were  reluctant  to  accept 
FSLIC  promissory  notes.  Many prospective  acquirers 
either  could  not  or would  not  invest  enough  of their 
own  resources  to  fully  recapitalize  a failing  institu- 
tion.  In  such  cases,  the  FSLIC  would  help  effect  a 
recapitalization  by  exchanging  its promissory  notes 
for  income-capital  certificates,  which  were  trans- 
ferable  to  the  acquiring  institution.  In  essence,  the 
6  Income-capital  certificates  did  not  have  any  stated  maturity, 
and  were  not  collateralized  or  secured.  Thus,  in  the  event  of 
legal  insolvency,  income-capital  certificates  gave  the  FSLIC 
essentially  the  same  status  as  those  of  a  holder  of  preferred 
equity  and  not  those  of a creditor  (see  GAO,  Th  Management 
Cons&ment Program, September  1987;  and  American Banker, 
12/26/85). 
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institution. 
In many  of these  reorganizations,  the  thrift’s  new 
owners  had very  little of their  own financial resources 
at stake.  Many  times,  the  acquirer  was  a marginally 
solvent  thrift  with  little  or  no  capital  of  its  own. 
Such  institutions  were  able  to  expand  rapidly  by 
taking  over  other  thrifts  in even  worse  financial  con- 
dition.  In  the  end,  the  FSLIC  bore  virtually  all 
residual  risks while the  management  and shareholders 
of the  acquiring  institution  stood  to profit handsomely 
if their  attempts  to  expand  their  operations  proved 
profitable. 
The  Bank Board pursued  such policies out of a lack 
of good  alternatives.  It lacked  the  resources  to close 
the  insolvent  institutions,  and  because  only  the 
chartering  agency  -  which  was the  Bank Board itself 
in  the  case  of  federally  chartered  thrifts-could 
declare  a savings  and  loan  legally  insolvent,  finan- 
cially  troubled  thrifts  could  be  kept  open  indefi- 
nitely.  Unfortunately,  the  Bank  Board also lacked  the 
resources  to adequately  monitor  the  many  insolvent 
savings  and  loans  for which  the  FSLIC  had  become 
the  residual  risk  bearer.  At  the  same  time,  deposit 
insurance  made  it possible  for even  the  most  poorly 
managed  and  unprofitable  thrifts  to  continue  ex- 
panding  their  operations.  Keeping  insolvent  thrifts 
open  under  these  circumstances  permitted  the 
FSLIC  to  defer  recognizing  its  losses,  but  exposed 
the  fund  to  the  risk  of very  large  future  losses. 
Th  Garn-St. Germain  Act  Lawmakers  responded 
to these  developments  by enacting  the  Garn-St.  Ger- 
main  Act  of  1982,  which  combined  a  program  of 
regulatory  forbearance  together  with  further  thrift 
industry  deregulation.  To  encourage  greater  regu- 
latory  forbearance  toward  financially  troubled  thrifts, 
the  Act  created  the  “net  worth  certificate”  program. 
The  net  worth  certificate  program  was  essentially  a 
derivative  of the  income-capital  certificates  program 
devised  earlier  by  the  Bank  Board.  Net  worth  cer- 
tificates  differed  from  income  capital  certificates  in 
that  they  did  not  constitute  a permanent  equity  in- 
vestment,  but  were  issued  only for a set  time  period 
authorized  by the  legislation.  Unlike  income-capital 
certificates,  net  worth  certificates  were  not  trans- 
ferable  and  so were  not  useful  in reorganizing  insol- 
vent  institutions  or  arranging  mergers.  In  fact,  the 
stated  purpose  of the  net  worth  certificate  program 
was  to  forestall  forced  mergers  or  other  regulatory 
actions  against  insolvent  thrifts  (see  GAO,  Net wart/l 
Certajicate  Asistance Pqyams,  ‘19 84). 
At  the  same  time,  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act 
attempted  to  reform  the  elements  of the  regulatory 
structure  most  often  blamed  for the  industry’s  prob- 
lems  by  liberalizing  investment  powers  of federally 
chartered  thrifts.  Some  states  such  as California  took 
the  initiative  to  deregulate  savings  and  loans  even 
further,  authorizing  state-chartered  thrifts  to engage 
in activities  such  as direct  participation  in real estate 
development.  Other  states,  notably  Texas  and 
Florida,  had granted  their  state-chartered  savings  and 
loans  liberalized  investment  powers  years  earlier. 
Thus,  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act  attempted  to 
forestall  action  in the hope  that  the  combined  policies 
of  forbearance  and  deregulation  would  facilitate  a 
return  to  profitability  and  financial  health  among 
insolvent  thrifts.  These  policies  were  adopted  in an 
effort to avert  the  need  for a federally  financed  rescue 
of the  FSLIC.  Rather  than  providing  the  Bank  Board 
with  the  resources  needed  to begin  closely  monitor- 
ing  and  closing  problem  institutions,  the  net  worth 
certificate  program  discouraged  regulators  from 
acting.  But the  added  risks  that  continued  regulatory 
forbearance  posed  to  the  FSLIC  fund  were  under- 
estimated.  Those  risks  were  soon  to  become 
apparent. 
Eariy attempts  at reregulation  Instead  of  improv- 
ing with  time  as policymakers  had  hoped,  the  finan- 
cial  condition  of  insolvent  thrifts  continued  to 
deteriorate.  Market  interest  rates  had  begun  a pro- 
nounced  and  sustained  decline  by  the  end  of  1982, 
and  economic  conditions  improved  as  the  severe 
recession  that  had begun  a year earlier  ended.  Lower 
interest  rates  and  favorable  economic  conditions 
throughout  the  nation  as  a whole  did  facilitate  the 
recovery  of  some  thrifts,  but  a  large  and  rapidly 
growing  segment  of the  industry  continued  to  incur 
heavy  losses.  Although  rising  interest  rates  had 
triggered  the  savings  and  loan crisis,  the  subsequent 
decline  in interest  rates  to more  normal  levels  failed 
to  restore  financial  health  to  many  of the  insolvent 
institutions  that  had  been  kept  open. 
It was  apparent  to  all in the  industry  by  this  time 
that  the  FSLIC  did  not  have  the  resources  to  give 
attention  to more  than  a few of the  most  financially 
troubled  institutions.  The  number  of Bank Board  and 
FHL  bank  examination  and  supervisory  personnel 
actually  declined  between  1981  and  1984,  even  as 
the  number  of thrift  insolvencies  soared  (Barth  and 
Bradley  1988,  46-47).  Attempts  by the  Bank  Board 
to  augment  the  supervisory  staff  were  discouraged 
by  the  Office  of Management  and  Budget.  Armed 
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new  investment  powers,  many  insolvent  thrifts  found 
it easy  to engage  in a variety  of risky  and  imprudent 
investment  schemes.  As time  went  on,  evidence  sur- 
faced  that  the  losses  at  many  institutions  were 
attributable  to  gross  mismanagement,  and  in  some 
cases  to  outright  fraud. 
The  rapidly  deteriorating  financial  condition  of the 
many  insolvent  S&Ls  that  had  been  kept  open  had 
begun  to  become  apparent  as early  as  1983,  when 
the  Bank  Board  began  taking  steps  to limit  the  risks 
that  poorly  capitalized  but  aggressively  managed 
thrifts  imposed  on  ‘the  FSLIC.  The  agency  pro- 
posed  rules  to limit  the  use  of brokered  deposits  by 
undercapitalized,  rapidly  expanding  thrifts.  That 
attempt  ultimately  proved  unsuccessful,  however, 
when  the  courts  ruled  that  the  agency  lacked  the 
legal  authority  to impose  such  a rule  and  lawmakers 
refused  to  grant  the  necessary  authority. 
Capital  requirements  were  raised  for  newly 
chartered  institutions,  but  the  new  capital  re- 
quirements  were  not  applied  to existing  institutions. 
The  income-capital  certificate  program  was  briefly 
discontinued,  only to be revived  again two years  later. 
In  1985,  the  Bank Board proposed  to effectively  raise 
minimum  net worth  requirements  by rescinding  some 
of  the  liberal  accounting  rules  introduced  in  198 1. 
It  also  proposed  to  limit  the  investment  powers  of 
undercapitalized  federally  insured  thrifts. 
Unfortunately,  these  initiatives  proved  largely 
ineffective  in stemming  the  growing  losses  incurred 
by  insolvent  and  ‘inadequately  supervised  thrifts. 
Attempts  by the  Bank  Board  to restrict  the  activities 
of state-chartered  thrifts  drew  considerable  resistance 
from  legislators  and  regulators  in. states  such  as 
California,  Florida,  and  Texas,  where  those  institu- 
tions  had  been  granted  broad  investment  powers. 
Managers  of insolvent  thrifts,  aware  that  the  FSLIC 
lacked  the  resources  to closely  supervise  more  than 
a  fraction  of  all the  undercapitalized  institutions  it 
insured,  proved  difficult  to  control.  Thrift  industry 
assets  grew  almost  20  percent  in  1984  alone  (See 
GAO,  Thr$Indusny Rtxtnxtming, 1985,  p.  8). Unlike 
the  initial  financial  difficulties  of  most  insolvent 
thrifts,  which  were  largely  attributable  to  the  effect 
of high  interest  rates  on  the  value  of their  mortgage 
portfolios,  most  losses  after  1982  stemmed  from 
credit  quality  problems.  According  to  Brumbaugh 
(1988,  p.  67),  asset  quality  problems  were  the  prin- 
cipal cause  behind  the  losses  experienced  by 80 per- 
cent  of  the  institutions  comprising  the  FSLIC’s 
caseload  of problem  thrifts  in 1984.  In contrast,  asset 
quality  problems  were  seen  to be  the  primary  cause 
of  the  losses  experienced  by  only  20  percent  of 
problem  thrifts  between  1980  and  1984. 
In certain  respects  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act  can  . 
be judged  to have  achieved  its goals.  Mortgage  assets 
declined  as a proportion  of all assets  held  by savings 
and loans after  1982,  with insolvent  institutions  taking 
greatest  advantage  of their  new  investment  powers. 
Unfortunately,  the  institutions  most  aggressive  in 
exploiting  their  new  powers  also  experienced  the 
greatest  deterioration  in  asset  quality.  Those  insti- 
tutions  subsequently  exposed  the  FSLIC  to  large 
losses  (Barth  and  Bradley  1988,  Tables  4  and  5). 
Th  Management  Cons&zment  Program  By  1985,  it 
was  becoming  apparent  that  the  combined  policy  of 
regulatory  forbearance  and deregulation  first adopted 
in response  to  the  thrift  industry  crisis  had  failed  to 
restore  financial  health  to  the  industry.  Instead,  it 
was  proving  to  be  a prescription  for  disaster.  In  an 
attempt  to gain greater  control  over  insolvent  thrifts 
that  continued  to experience  growing  losses,  the Bank 
Board  instituted  its “Management  Consignment  Pro- 
gram”  (MCP).  An institution  brought  into  the  MCP 
typically  had  its  management  replaced  with  a con- 
servator  selected  by  the  Bank  Board.  The  program 
was  conceived  as a means  of temporarily  warehous- 
ing hopelessly  insolvent  institutions  until  they  could 
be  sold  or  liquidated  by  the  FSLIC.  Many  institu- 
tions  placed  in  the  MCP  in  1985  were  still  in  the 
program  and  still incurring  losses  two years  later  (see 
GAO,  The Management  Consignment  Pnpam,  198 7). 
The  income-capital  certificates  program  was  re-. 
introduced  for  institutions  placed  in  the  MCP. 
Using  its  own  promissory  notes  to  “recapitalize” 
insolvent  thrifts,  the  FSLIC  attempted  to  sell  or 
merge  those  institutions.  But  as industry  conditions 
grew  worse,  it  became  increasingly  apparent  to 
market  participants  that  the  FSLIC  lacked  the  finan- 
cial  resources  to  deal  with  the  heavy  losses  ac- 
cumulated  by  troubled  S&Ls.  Potential  acquirers 
became  reluctant  to accept  the  FSLIC’s  promissory 
notes,  further  hampering  the  agency’s  efforts  to  sell 
off  insolvent  thrifts.  Investor  reluctance  to  accept 
FSLIC  notes  stemmed  at least  in part  from  a ruling 
by  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  that 
such  notes  could  not  be  counted  as assets  in deter- 
mining  net worth  under  Generally  Accepted  Accoun- 
ting  Principles  (see  GAO,  Th  Management  Consign- 
ment Pmgcam,  198 7). 
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By  1985,  the  rapidly  deteriorating  condition  of 
many  insolvent  thrifts  had  so strained  the  resources 
of the  FSLIC  that  the  Bank  Board  finally had  to ad- 
mit  that  the  insurance  fund  needed  outside  funding. 
But as long  as depositors  at insolvent  thrifts  felt con- 
fident  that  the  U.S.  Treasury  would  ultimately 
guarantee  the  safety  of their  deposits,  they  had  no 
reason  to  withdraw  their  funds.  And  as  long  as  in- 
solvent  thrifts could continue  to attract  deposits,  there 
was  no incentive  to appropriate  the  funds  needed  to 
recapitalize  the  FSLIC.  As a result,  hundreds  of in- 
solvent  institutions  were  permitted  to  continue  ac- 
cumulating  losses  until  the  condition  of the  FSLIC 
become  so  critical  that  private  investors  began  to 
question  whether  the  U.S.  government  would  ulti- 
mately  honor  all  the  debts  accumulated  by  the 
FSLIC.  In the  end,  the  actions  of private  investors 
ultimately  forced  lawmakers  to recapitalize  the  sav- 
ings  and  loan  industry’s  insurance  fund. 
EMy  attempts  to recapitalize  th  FSLIC  In  1985, 
a study  published  by  staff  members  of the  FHLBB 
concluded  that  400  to  500  FSLIC-insured  thrifts 
were  GAAP  insolvent  and  estimated  the  cost  of 
resolving  those  insolvencies  at  $15.8  billion.  The 
FSLIC’s  official  reserves  in  1985  were  less  than 
$6  billion.  The  report  concluded  that  closing  or 
reorganizing  even  a fraction  of the  insolvent  thrifts 
insured  by  the  FSLIC  would  deplete  the  insurance 
fund’s  reserves  (Barth,  Brumbaugh,  Sauerhaft,  and 
Wang  1985). 
Later  that  year,  FHLBB  Chairman  Edwin  Gray 
acknowledged  to  Congress  that  the  FSLIC  lacked 
the  funding  it  needed  to  deal  with  its  caseload  of 
problem  institutions.  To  raise  the  necessary  funds, 
he proposed  imposing  a one-time  assessment  of one 
percent  on  all  FSLIC-insured  thrifts,  as  the  Bank 
Board  was  authorized  to  do  by  law  (see  American 
Banker-,  10/17/85).  But Gray’s  proposal  encountered 
a great  deal  of resistance  from  the  savings  and  loan 
industry  and  was  subsequently  withdrawn.  Instead, 
the  FSLIC  exercised  its  authority  to  impose  a  l/8 
percent  special  deposit  insurance  assessment.  The 
special  assessment  generated  an additional  $1 billion 
in  1985,  but  that  amount  fell far short  of providing 
the  FSLIC  with  the  funding  it needed  to  continue 
operating  (Brumbaugh  1988,  p.  51). 
Alarmed  by  the  Bank  Boards  bleak  assessment 
of  financial  condition  of  the  thrift  industry  and  its 
insurance  fund,  Congress  asked  the  General  Ac- 
counting  Office  to  prepare  a  report  on  industry 
conditions  and  the  implications  for the  FSLIC  fund. 
The  GAO  report,  released  in February  of 1986,  con- 
cluded  that  the  cost  of  closing  insolvent  FSLIC- 
insured  thrifts  in  operation  at  the  time  could  be  as 
high  as  $22.5  billion,  an  amount  well  in  excess  of 
the  FSLIC’s  reserves  (see  GAO,  Potential  Demands 
on the FSLIC Fand,  1986).  In a subsequent  Congres- 
sional  hearing,  a GAO  official  concluded  that  most 
of  the  insolvent  thrifts  being  “warehoused”  by  the 
FSLIC  were  unlikely  to  ever  recover.  He  went  on 
to  estimate  that  it  could  take  anywhere  from  5  to 
20 years  to work  out the  problems  of insolvent  thrifts 
(see  Washington  Financial Reports, 311  O/86). 
Obstacles  con$wzting  recapitaliwtion  Bank  Board 
and U.S.  Treasury  officials had begun  meeting  in late 
1985 to devise  a recapitalization  plan for the  FSLIC. 
FHLBB  Chairman  Edwin  Gray  unveiled  the  Reagan 
administration’s  plan  in March  of  1986.  The  stated 
goal of the  plan was  to effect  a recapitalization  of the 
FSLIC  without  taxpayer  funding.  The  plan  relied  on 
a transfer  of resources  from  the  Federal  Home  Loan 
Banks  and  a continuation  of the  special  deposit  in- 
surance  assessment  against  thrifts  as  part  of  an 
elaborate  arrangement  devised  to keep  funding  costs 
off the  government  budget.’ 
Enactment  of  the  recapitalization  measure  was 
delayed  for  over  a  year,  however,  because  it  en- 
countered  a great  deal  of opposition  from  the  thrift 
industry.  There  were  two reasons  for this opposition. 
The  first was the  plan’s reliance  on an indefinite  con- 
tinuation  of the  annual  l/8  percent  special  deposit 
insurance  assessment.  Thrift  industry  spokesmen 
maintained  that  the  plan’s reliance  on a continuation 
of the  special  deposit  insurance  assessment  to  ser- 
vice  such  a debt  load placed  an unfair  burden  on the 
solvent  institutions.  Industry  representatives  argued 
further  that the proposed  $15 billion funding  authority 
would  give  the  FSLIC  much  more  than  it  needed 
to  deal  with  its  caseload  of  troubled  institutions. 
7 The  plan  called  for the  creation  of a shell  funding  corporation 
that  would  issue  bonds  to  fund  the  FSLIC.  The  funding  cor- 
poration  was  to  be  capitalized  through  the  transfer  of a portion 
of the  excess  capital  of  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Banks.  The 
initial  capitalization  was  to  be  used  to  purchase  zero-coupon 
Treasury  bonds.  These  bonds  were  to provide  collateral  secur- 
ing the  repayment  of the  bond  principal.  Interest  payments  on 
the  bonds  were  to  be  serviced  by  revenues  to  be  generated  by 
continuing  the  special  deposit  insurance  assessmen?  imposed  on 
FSLIC-insured  thrifts.  This  complicated  funding  scheme  was 
chosen  because  it  avoided  the  direct  appropriation  of federal 
funds  and  so  permitted  the  cost  of the  plan  to  be  kept  off the, 
government’s  budget.  The  plan  provided  the  basic  framework 
behind  the  Competitive  Equality  Banking  Act  of  1987,  which 
established  the  Financing  Corporation  (FICO)  to issue  off-budget 
debt  obligations.  See  Brumbaugh  (1988,  ch.  3) for more  details. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  15 As  an  alternative  to  the  administration-sponsored 
initiative,  industry  representatives  proposed  a plan 
that  would  require  less  borrowing  by  delaying  the 
reorganization  of some  insolvent  thrifts  for ten  years 
or  more.  They  also  lobbied  for  a formal  timetable 
for  the  phaseout  of  the  special  deposit  insurance 
assessment  (see  Washington Financial  Reports, 
7128186). 
A  second  objection  to  the  recapitalization  plan 
stemmed  from  the  prospect  of an end  to policies  of 
regulatory  forbearance.  Regulatory  forbearance  had 
become  a politically  popular  policy.  So many  thrifts 
had  become  financially  troubled  by this  time  that  the 
group  constituted  a powerful  special  interest  lobby. 
The  majority  of thrift  insolvencies  were  concentrated 
in  geographic  areas  experiencing  severe  regional 
economic  problems.  Congressional  representatives 
from  economically  depressed  areas  argued  that  clos- 
ing  or  reorganizing  the  financially  troubled  institu- 
tions  in  their  districts  would  further  exacerbate 
economic  problems  in  those  regions  (Brumbaugh 
1988,  p.  174).  Attempts  by some  lawmakers  to link 
recapitalization  of  the  FSLIC  with  a  broader 
regulatory  reform  proposal  further  slowed  down  ac- 
tion  on  the  measure. 
FSLIC  declared  insolvent  As  debate  over  the 
recapitalization  measure  dragged  on  into  1987,  the 
FSLIC’s  need  for  funding  began  to  grow  critical. 
Insolvent  thrifts  in Texas  and  the  Southwest,  where 
most  problem  institutions  were  concentrated,  were 
forced  to  pay  rising  premiums  over  market  rates  in 
an  effort  to  attract  deposits  (Brumbaugh  1988,  pp. 
70-74;  Hirschhorn  1990).  As public  concernover  the 
FSLIC’s  financial  condition  grew,  the  risk premiums 
paid  by  insolvent  institutions  rose  significantly 
(Hirschhorn  1989a,  1989b). 
In  an  effort  to  find  an  alternative  funding  source, 
the  Bank  Board  had  turned  to  the  Federal  Home 
Loan  Banks.  The  FHL  banks  typically  extended  ad- 
vances  to member  institutions  under  the  security  of 
certain  collateral,  most  often  home  mortgages.  In- 
solvent  thrifts  experiencing  the  greatest  difficulty 
attracting  deposits  could  not  easily expand  their  bor- 
rowing  from  the  FHL  banks,  however,  because  they 
could  not  post  the  necessary  collateral.  The  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  System  had  been  established  to 
provide  a source  of funding  for home  mortgages,  not 
to  supply  capital  to  insolvent  thrifts.  To  facilitate 
lending  to  insolvent  S&Ls,  the  Bank  Board  autho- 
rized  the  FHL  banks  to extend  advances  secured  by 
promissory  notesissued  by  the  FSLIC  (see  GAO, 
Forbearance  for  TroElbl’ed  Institutions,  May  1987;  and 
The Management Consignment  Pn+yam,  September 
1987).  By the  end  of  1986,  the  Dallas  FHLB  had 
issued  over  $1 billion  in advances  to insolvent  thrifts 
secured  only  by  FSLIC  notes. 
Early  in  1987,  the  GAO  announced  that  the 
FSLIC  had become  officially insolvent,  with its deficit 
estimated  to  exceed  $3  billion  at  the  end  of  1986 
(see  “Statement  of  Frederick  D.  Wolf”  in  U.S. 
Congress,  House,  March  1987;  and  WaliStmetJour- 
nal, 3/4/87).  The  announcement  by  the  GAO  rais- 
ed concerns  over  the  creditworthiness  of the  FSLIC’s 
promissory  notes.  A few days  after the  GAO’s  public 
statement,  the  accounting  firm of Delloite,  Haskins 
and  Sells,  which  had  been  hired  to  audit  the  finan- 
cial  statements  of the  Federal  Home  Loan  Banks, 
threatened  to issue  a qualified  opinion  on the  finan- 
cial  condition  of  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  of 
Dallas. 
The  $1  billion  the  Dallas  FHLB  had  advanced 
solely  on  the  security  of  FSLIC  notes  constituted 
a significant  fraction  of the  bank’s  capital.  Based  on 
the  GAO  audit  of  the  FSLIC,  the  Dallas  bank’s 
auditor  had concluded  that  the  fund  might  be unable 
to back  the  guarantees  securing  the  bank’s  advances 
to insolvent  thrifts.  A qualified auditor’s opinion  would 
have  made  it virtually  impossible  for the  Dallas  bank 
to raise funds  in private  capital markets.  The  FSLICs 
mounting  financial  problems  had  come  to  threaten 
the  financial  stability  of  the  entire  Federal  Home 
Loan  Bank  System. 
To  avoid  receiving  a qualified  opinion,  the  Dallas 
FHLB  demanded  immediate  repayment  of  the  $1 
billion  in FSLIC  notes  it was  holding.  Fearing  that 
a qualified opinion  on the condition  of the  Dallas bank 
could  cast  doubt  on  the  creditworthiness  of  the 
entire  FHLB  system,  the  Bank  Board  quickly 
acceded  to the  Dallas  FHLB’s  demand  and instructed 
the  FSLIC  to repay  the  notes  it had  issued.8  Repay- 
ment  of the  notes  left  the  FSLIC  with  less  than  $1 
billion  in  cash  reserves. 
During  this  period,  the  Dallas  FHLB  instituted  a 
program  to  secure  an  alternative  funding  source  for 
a  The  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  System  funds  the  advances 
it extends  to  member  institutions  through  the  sale  of bonds  to 
private  investors.  Obligations  issued  by the  Federal  Home  Loan 
Bank  System  are  the  joint  liability  of all twelve  Federal  Home 
Loan  Banks.  Moreover,  the  Dallas  FHLB  was  not  the  only bank 
in the  system  that  had  lent  against  the  security  of FSLIC  notes; 
it just  had  a relatively  greater  exposure  to  loss  in the  event  of 
a  default  by  the  FSLIC  (see American Banks,  3/16/87). 
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still  attract  deposits  were  induced  to  place  insured 
deposits  with  insolvent  thrifts  experiencing  funding 
problems  (see  Wail Street  Jourxai, 3/Z/87).  But  this 
program  by itself failed  to provide  sufficient  funding 
for insolvent  thrifts.  In June,  the  outflow  of deposits 
from  troubled  Texas  thrifts  began  to  accelerate. 
Officials of the  Dallas  FHLB  were  forced  to negotiate 
with  deposit  brokers  in  an  effort  to  ensure  that 
troubled  thrifts  in that  district  could  continue  to raise 
funds’  through  brokered  deposits  (see  American 
Banker, 611 l/87).  It was  only  a few years  earlier  that 
the  Bank Board had attempted  to curb  insured  thrifts’ 
reliance  on  deposit  brokers.  Ironically,  the  agency 
found  itself  relying  on the  same  brokers  to continue 
funding  the  problem  institutions  it was  struggling  to 
keep  open  while  waiting  for  the  enactment  of  a 
recapitalization  measure. 
Th  Competitive  Equa&y Banking Act of 198 7  For 
a time,  it appeared  that  opponents  of the  recapitali- 
zation  bill would  be successful  in limiting  the  amount 
of funding  approved  by  Congress  to  $5  billion,  an 
amount  the  GAO  had  concluded  would  be  insuffi- 
cient  to  deal  with  the  magnitude  of  losses  ac- 
cumulated  by  insolvent  thrifts  (see  GAO,  The 
TreasrylFeahal Home  Loan Bank  Board Plbn&  FSLIC 
Recapitalization, March  1987).  However,  revela- 
tions  of large-scale  fraud  at  a number  of financially 
troubled  thrifts  that  had  been  kept  open  through 
regulatory  forbearance  created  pressure  to  enact  a 
larger  recapitalization  measure.  The  Competitive 
Equality  Banking  Act  (CEBA),  enacted  in the  sum- 
mer  of  1987,  authorized  the  issue  of $10.8  billion 
in  bonds  to  recapitalize  the  FSLIC.  The  bill  also 
included  language  mandating  the  extension  of  for- 
bearance  to  financially  troubled  thrifts  operating  in 
certain  designated  economically  depressed  areas  of 
the  country. 
Legal  status of  FSLIC  Notes questioned Within 
months  of  the  passage  of  the  recapitalization  bill, 
articles  discussing  the  ultimate  necessity  of  a 
taxpayer-funded  bailout  of the  FSLIC  began  appear- 
ing  in  the  financial  press  (see  American Banker, 
1 l/ 18/87).  In November,  the  American  Institute  of 
Certified  Public Accountants  (AICPA)  issued  its Prac- 
tice Buletin 3 warning  auditors  to  consider  the  risks 
associated  with  any  FSLIC  notes  appearing  on  the 
balance  sheets  of thrifts  because  of the  insurer’s ques- 
tionable  financial  condition.  A provision  pledging  the 
full faith  and  credit  of the  U.S.  government  behind 
all federally  insured  deposits  had  been  included  in 
the  CEBA.  But  whether  this  pledge  extended  to 
promissory  notes  issued  by  the  FSLIC  to  private 
investors  was uncertain.  As the  ensuing  events  show, 
the  AICPA  warning  marked  an  important  turning 
point  in the  unfolding  crisis.  By limiting  the  FSLIC’s 
ability  to continue  issuing  debt,  the  AICPA  bulletin 
helped  to precipitate  a funding  crisis  that  ultimately 
forced  lawmakers  to recapitalize  the  savings  and loan 
industry’s  insurance  fund. 
In  April  of  1988,  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank 
of Dallas  was  forced  to  issue  its  1987  annual  report 
without  an auditor’s  opinion.  Since  its last audit,  the 
Dallas  bank  had  once  again  begun  lending  on  the 
security  of FSLIC  notes  and had $500  million in such 
advances  outstanding.  Its accounting  firm,  Delloite, 
Haskins  and Sells,  withheld  its opinion  on the  bank’s 
financial  condition  pending  the  release  of the  GAO’s 
audit  of  the  FSLIC  (see  BNA?  Banking Report, 
4/18/88). 
When  the  FSLIC  released  its  preliminary  1987 
annual  report  a  week  later,  it  acknowledged  that 
despite  the  additional  funding  the  agency  had  re- 
ceived  in  1987,  it was  still  insolvent  at  the  end  of 
the  year.  According  to  Bank  Board  officials,  the  ex- 
tent  of the  FSLIC’s  insolvency  had  almost  doubled, 
to  $11.6  billion,  during  1987  (see  BNA’S Banking 
Report, 4/25/88). 
Based  on  its  audit,  the  GAO  concluded  that  the 
FSLIC  had  understated  the  extent  of its insolvency. 
The  government’s  auditors  projected  the  cost  of 
resolving  the  FSLIC’s  existing  caseload  of insolvent 
thrifts  would  be  in excess  of $17  billion,  leaving  the 
agency  with  a deficit  of $13.7  billion  at  the  end  of 
1987.  The  GAO  report  went  on to warn  of the  costs 
of dealing  with  the  more  than  300  insolvent  thrifts 
that  the  FSLIC  had  yet  to  formally  place  under 
receivership,  which  it cautioned  could  reach  as high 
as  $19  billion.  Based  on  these  cost  projections,  a 
GAO  spokesman  concluded  that  “further  congres- 
sional  action,  beyond  that  already  taken  under  the 
Competitive  Equality  Banking  Act  of  1987  to 
recapitalize  the  Corporation  [FSLIC],  may  well  be 
needed  to enable  the Corporation  to continue  to meet 
its  obligations  (see  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  May 
1988).  Later  that  year,  the  GAO  would  acknowledge 
that  its earlier  estimates  had  grossly  underestimated 
the  extent  of  the  FSLIC’s  insolvency. 
In July,  the  accounting  firm  of Delloite,  Haskins 
and  Sells  finally  released  an  unqualified  opinion  on 
the financial condition  of the Dallas  FHLB.  However, 
its  report  voiced  concerns  over  the  ultimate  collec- 
tibility of the  FSLIC  notes  the  bank  held  as collateral 
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bank  to  limit  such  advances  in  the  future  (see 
American Banker, 7129188). 
Although  the  Dallas  FHLB  had  received  an  un- 
qualified  opinion  on its financial  condition,  there  was 
still  considerable  concern  over  the  ultimate  credit- 
worthiness  of  the  FSLIC’s  promissory  notes.  The 
Bank  Board  had  announced  an  ambitious  plan  to 
reorganize  and  sell  a  record  number  of  insolvent 
thrifts  during  1988,  but  the  plan  depended  on  the 
willingness  of  private  investors  to  accept  FSLIC 
promissory  notes  and  other  financial  guarantees.  But 
news  of  the  FSLIC’s  deteriorating  financial  condi- 
tion  made  buyers  increasingly  reluctant  to accept  the 
fund’s  notes.  Because  the  AICPA  had  warned 
auditors  to  consider  the  ultimate  collectibility  of 
FSLIC  notes  as  questionable,  potential  acquirers 
faced  the  risk  that  auditors  would  not  grant  the 
institution  an unqualified  opinion  if its.balance  sheet 
included  FSLIC  notes  among  its  assets.  Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission  regulations  made  it vir- 
tually  impossible  for  a firm  that  received  a qualified 
auditor’s  statement  to sell its securities  to investors. 
To  facilitate  the  issue  of  more  FSLIC  notes, 
FHLBB  Chairman  Wall  asked  the  U.S.  Congress  to 
pass  a resolution  placing  the  full faith  and  credit  of 
the  U.S.  government  behind  notes  issued  by  the 
FSLIC.  The  Senate  voted  in favor of such  a measure 
in August,  but  the  proposal  encountered  resistance 
in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
At issue  was  the  question  of whether  the  issuance 
of notes  and  financial  guarantees  by the  FSLIC  con- 
stituted  unauthorized  borrowing  in  excess  of  the 
amount  the  FSLIC  was  legally  permitted  to  borrow 
under  the  CEBA.  Confidence  in the  Bank  Board  had 
been  undermined  by  the  fact  that  the  agency  kept 
revising  its  estimates  of the  ultimate  cost  of resolv- 
ing  insured  thrift  insolvencies.  Between  the  start  of 
the  year  and  July  of  1988,  the  Bank  Board  revised 
its estimates  of the  cost  of resolving  thrift  insolven- 
cies  on  at  least  three  separate  occasions,  almost 
doubling  its  projected  costs  from  $22.7  to  $42.5 
billion. Some  members  of Congress  felt that  the  Bank 
Board  had  not  been  forthcoming  with  details  of its 
planned  expenditures.  Rep.  John  LaFalce  clearly 
summarized  the  issues  surrounding  the  debate  over 
granting  FSLIC  notes  full faith and credit  status:  “We 
are  now  in a position  where  the  Bank  Board  has,  in 
effect,  issued  at  its  whim  unlimited  Treasury  debt 
at levels  in excess  of its FICO  bond  authority  which 
the  Congress  is  now  being  pressured  to  belatedly 
guarantee  in  order  to  keep  the  FSLIC  and  the  in- 
dustry  afloat  (see  BNA’s Bank-ing  Report, 8115/88).” 
The  prospects  for a favorable  vote  on  the  resolu- 
tion  requested  by  the  Bank  Board  were,  therefore, 
dubious  at  best.  In  an  apparent  effort  to  avoid  an 
explicit  rejection  of the  full faith  and  credit  resolu- 
tion  by Congress,  Chairman  Wall announced  he had 
withdrawn  his  request  for  a vote  on  the  resolution 
on  September  8.  Although  Reagan  administration 
officials  had  supported  enactment  of the  resolution 
at  first,  Treasury  Department  officials  later  an- 
nounced  that the request  was withdrawn  because  they 
had  determined  that  notes  issued  by  the  FSLIC 
already  enjoyed  U.S.  government  backing  (see BNA’s 
Banking Report, 9119188). 
The  GAO  publicly  supported  the Treasury  Depart- 
ment’s  position  (see  BNA’s  Banking  Report, 
1 l/l  llSS[Z]).  But  the  AICPA  was  not  satisfied  by 
these  pronouncements.  The  organization  told  the 
Bank  Board  that  in  the  absence  of  a congressional 
resolution,  it would  require  an  opinion  by  the  U.S. 
Attorney  General  on the  legal status  of FSLIC  notes 
before  it would  reconsider  its warning  to auditors  on 
the  status  of FSLIC  notes.  At  first  the  Bank  Board 
agreed  to  ask  the  Attorney  General  to  issue  an 
opinion  (see  BNA’s Banking Report,  9119188  and 
1117188).  However,  in  November  a  Bank  Board 
spokesman  announced  that  FHLB  Chairman  Wall 
had  decided  not  to  seek  the  Attorney  General’s 
opinion  after all. Instead,  legislation  clarifying the legal 
status  of  FSLIC  notes  would  be  sought  from  the 
10 1  st Congress  when  it convened  the  following  year 
(see  BNA’S Banking Report,  11111/88[  11). 
By  this  time  the  FSLIC’s  situation  had  become 
desperate.  The  1987  recapitalization  measure  had 
failed to provide  enough  funding  and the  100th  Con- 
gress  had  refused  to  authorize  the  issue  of  more 
promissory  notes.  The  Bank  Board  had  estimated 
it could  not  service  more  than  $16  billion  in  notes 
and  guarantees  (see  American Banker, 9119189).  But 
by  November  the  agency  had  committed  itself  to 
nearly  $25  billion  in  obligations,  which  included 
various  financial  guarantees  to  purchasers  of  insol- 
vent  thrifts as well as promissory  notes  (BNA’s  Banking 
Report, 1 l/l  1/88[3]).  For  almost  a decade  the  Bank 
Board  had  struggled  to  keep  insolvent  thrifts  open 
in  an  effort  to  forestall  the  need  to  close  those  in- 
stitutions  and  pay  off insured  depositors.  Insulated 
from  the  discipline  that  the  market  normally  places 
on  risk-taking,  many  of  those  institutions  had  em- 
barked  upon  questionable  and risky  investments  that 
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the  FSLIC  appeared  imminent.  Private  investors 
would  no longer  accept  the  insurance  fund’s promises 
and financial guarantees,  but insisted  on firm evidence 
that  it would  be  given  the  resources  to  meet  those 
obligations.  In  the  end,  it  was  the  discipline  im- 
posed  by  private  investors  that  finally  forced  action 
to  restore  the  thrift  industry’s  insurance  fund  to 
solvency. 
The  Financial  Institutions  Reform, 
Recovery,  and  Enforcement  Act  of  1989 
Projected  costs  of dealing  with the growing  backlog 
of  hopelessly  insolvent  thrifts  continued  to  climb 
throughout  1988.  By the  end  of the  year,  the  GAO 
had raised  its estimate  to over  $I  100 billion (see BNA’s 
Banking Report, 12119188).  But  the  100th  Congress 
had  adjourned  without  providing  additional  funding 
for the  FSLIC,  and  so one  of the  first problems  fac- 
ing  the  incoming  Bush  Administration  was  that  of 
devising  a plan  to rescue  the  insurance  fund  from  an 
impending  default. 
The  Bush  Administration  unveiled  its plan  to deal 
with  the  burgeoning  crisis in the  savings  and  loan in- 
dustry  on  February  6,  1989.  In  addition  to  asking 
Congress  to  authorize  funding  to  recapitalize  the 
FSLIC,  the  Bush  Plan  also  mandated  a  complete 
reorganization  of  the  federal  savings  and  loan 
regulatory  system.  The  FDIC  was  called  upon  to 
assume  supervisory  control  of insolvent- savings  and 
loans  until  the  proposed  legislation  was  ratified  by 
Congress  (see BNA’s Banking Report, 2113189).  The 
Bush  Plan  became  the  model  for  the  Financial  In- 
stitutions  Reform,  Recovery  and  Enforcement  Act, 
or  FIRREA,  enacted  in  August  of  1989. 
The  new  savings  and  loan  regulatory  system 
created  by  the  act  is  noteworthy  in  at  least  two 
respects.  First,  FIRREA  represents  an  effort  to  re- 
regulate  savings  and  loans  by restricting  their  invest- 
ment  powers  and  requiring  them  to  specialize  more 
in mortgage  lending.  It  also  calls  for  an  end  to  the 
capital  forbearance  policies  instituted  in the  198Os, 
requiring  savings  and  loans  to  meet  capital  re- 
quirements  at least  as stringent  as those  imposed  on 
commercial  banks.  The  new  regulations  are  to  be 
enforced  through  enhanced  supervisory  controls  and 
stricter  penalties  in  cases  involving  fraudulent  or 
criminal  activities. 
Second,  FIRREA  brought  about  a  complete 
reorganization  of  the  federal  savings  and  loan 
regulatory  agencies.  The  law  dissolved  the  FSLIC 
and  established  a new  deposit  insurance  fund,  the 
Savings  Association  Insurance  Fund,  or  “SAIF,” 
under  the  auspices  of the  FDIC.  It  created  a new 
agency,  the  Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC), 
to take  control  of the  FSLIC’s  caseload  of insolvent 
savings  and  loans.  FIRREA  also  disbanded  the 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  replacing  it with 
a new  federal  chartering  agency  under  the  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  known  as  the 
Office  of  Thrift  Supervision,  or  OTS.  The  goal 
behind  this  restructuring  was  to eliminate  perceived 
conflicts  of  interest  inherent  in  the  old  system, 
whereby  the  chartering  agency  was  also responsible 
for administering  the  deposit  insurance  fund.  As the 
history  of the  savings  and  loan  crisis  revealed,  that 
organizational  structure  created  a situation  where  the 
chartering  agency  had  both  the  incentive  and  the 
means  to  delay  resolution  of the  problem  for  a pro- 
tracted  period. 
Unlike  earlier  attempts  to  resolve  the  financial 
difficulties  facing  the  savings  and  loan  industry,  the 
enactment  of  FIRREA  was  accompanied  by  a 
recognition  that  government  funding  would  be 
needed  to resolve  the  crisis.  In addition  to allocating 
funds  to  pay  off  the  obligations  incurred  by  the 
FSLIC  before  its dissolution,  the  RTC  is to receive 
$50  billion  in  additional  funding.9  The  law  also 
imposed  higher  deposit  insurance  assessments  for 
commercial  banks  as  well  as  thrifts  to  raise  the 
reserves  of each  industry’s  deposit  insurance  fund. 
III.  DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  REFORM 
With  the  demise  of  the  FSLIC,  government 
regulators  have  been  left  to  deal  with  a backlog  of 
almost  600  insolvent  savings  and  loans.  Estimates 
of the  ultimate  cost  of resolving  the  remaining  thrift 
9  In addition  to providing  for continued  funding  of FSLIC  obli- 
gations  incurred  prior  to  the  dissolution  of the  fund,  FIRREA 
authorized  the  RTC  to borrow  $50  billion  to use  in dealing  with 
insolvent  thrifts.  A new  funding  agency,  the  Resolution  Fund- 
ing Corporation  (REFCORP),  was  created  to borrow  $30 billion. 
Like  the  funding  corporation  used  to borrow  the  funds  allocated 
by the  CEBA,  REFCORP  was  capitalized  by a transfer  of surplus 
capital  from  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Banks  and  was  created  to 
minimize  the  impact  of the  deposit  insurance  rescue  plan  on the 
government’s  budget  deficit.  Because  the  Federal  Home  Loan 
Banks  provided  the  funding  to guarantee  repayment  of the  prin- 
cioal.  funds  borrowed  bv REFCORP  are not  officially classified 
asUS.  Treasury  debt.  The  Treasury  was  authorized  to borrow 
the  remaining  $20  billion  and  to  transfer  the  proceeds  to  the 
RTC.  To  the  extent  that  deposit  insurance  assessments  levied 
against  savings  and  loans  fail  short  of  the  amount  needed  to 
service  REFCORP  debt.  the  Treasurv  bears  resoonsibilitv  for 
providing  the  funds  needed  to  maintain  the  inteiest  payments 
on  such  debt. 
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ment  of FIRREA. The  crisis created  by the  collapse 
of the  savings  and loan industry’s  insurance  fund  sug- 
gests  that  the  deposit  insurance  system  is  in  need 
of reform.  In this  section  we  critically  analyze  alter- 
natives  for regulatory  and  deposit  insurance  reform, 
beginning  with  the  reforms  put  in place  by FIRREA. 
A  Critical  Review  of  FJRREA 
FIRREA represents  the  most  sweeping  financial 
regulatory  legislation  enacted  since the  Great  Depres- 
sion.  It not only created  a new deposit  insurance  fund, 
but  completely  restructured  the  savings  and  loan 
regulatory  system  established  in the  1930s.  FIRREA 
also marks  at least  a temporary  halt in a trend  toward 
financial  deregulation  evident  in legislation  enacted 
earlier  in  the  decade. 
The  new  law’s emphasis  on stricter  regulation  and 
enhanced  supervision  represents  an attempt  to limit 
potential  future  losses  stemming  from bank  and thrift 
insolvencies,  but  such  measures  address  the  symp- 
toms  of the  present  crisis  rather  than  its causes.  The 
financial problems  that  beset  savings  and loan institu- 
tions  earlier  in the  decade  were  rooted  in restrictive 
regulations  that  prohibited  thrifts  from  diversifying 
their  investments,  making  them  vulnerable  to interest 
rate  risk.  While  it is prudent  to limit  the  investment 
powers  of  insolvent  institutions  until  they  can  be 
reorganized,  the  events  of the  last decade  give cause 
to question  whether  such  a regulatory  structure  can 
assure  a financially sound  and profitable  industry  over 
the  longer  run. 
Recently,  some  analysts  have  begun  to  question 
whether  depository  institutions  limited  to  investing 
predominantly  in residential  mortgages  can  remain 
viable.  Brumbaugh  and  Carron  (1989),  for example, 
argue  that  recent  changes  in  the  financial  markets 
have  made  funding  mortgage  lending  less  profitable 
for insured  deposit-taking  institutions.  As the  market 
for  mortgage-backed  assets  has  become  more  effi- 
cient,  with  investors  bypassing  financial  intermedi- 
aries  by  buying  and  holding  mortgage-backed 
securities  directly,  there  appears  to be  less of a need 
for  specialized,  deposit-taking  intermediaries 
dedicated  to  warehousing  mortgage  loans. 
To  be  certain,  intermediaries  specializing  in 
residential  housing  finance  will continue  to  play  an 
important  role  in  the  U.S.  economy.  But  it  now 
appears  that  only  a fraction  of existing  savings  and 
loans  will find  it profitable  to  continue  specializing 
in  mortgage  lending.  What  this  means  is  that  the 
industry  may welI need  to contract.  Much  of that  con- 
traction  will come  about  through  consolidation.  But 
the  contraction  of an industry  is often  accompanied 
by the  withdrawal  of firms  from  that  industry.  If the 
new,  more  restrictive  regulatory  structure  makes  it 
difficult for insured  thrifts  to earn  profits,  the  industry 
could  continue  to experience  financial  difficulties  in 
the  future.  Financial  intermediaries  specializing  in 
residential  lending  may  prove  viable  only  if affiliated 
with  larger,  diversified  financial  firms.  FIRREA  per- 
mits  commercial  banks  to acquire  financially  healthy 
thrifts for the first time  (in the past,  commercial  banks 
were  only  permitted  to take  over  failing  savings  and 
loans).  And,  as Brewer  (1989)  observes,  simply  re- 
quiring  savings  and loans  to specialize  more  in mort- 
gage  lending  will  not  prevent  excessive  risk-taking 
if that  is  the  goal  of  an  institution’s  management. 
Can  “It” Happen  Again? 
One  area  of regulation  FIRREA did  not  address 
is  the  mechanism  for  resolving  failures  of  insured 
depositories.  New  rules  specify  higher  minimum  net 
worth  requirements  for savings  and  loans,  but  there 
is  no  statutory  provision  ensuring  that  insolvent 
institutions  will be closed  more  promptly  in the future 
than  they  have  been  in the  past.  As long  as deposits 
are  fully  insured  there  is no  market  mechanism  to 
ensure  the  prompt  closing  of insolvent  institutions. 
In the  end,  how  thrift  insolvencies  are  handled  will 
still depend  on the  resources  available  to the  deposit 
insurance  fund. 
An  important  lesson  emeiging.from  the  savings 
and  loan  crisis  is  that  the  deposit  insurance  funds 
themselves  can  become  insolvent.  As  Barth,  Bar- 
tholomew,  and  Bradley  (1989a)  have  noted,  the 
system  as  it  is  presently  organized  lacks  certain 
important  safeguards  that  one  would  expect  to  be 
present  in private  insurance  arrangements.  Govern- 
ment-sponsored  deposit  insurance  was not  intended 
to be self-financing,  as privateinsurance  arrangements 
are,  but  ultimately  relies  on government  guarantees 
to  provide  depositors  with  assurances  of the  safety 
of the  funds  they  place  with banks.  At the  same  time, 
existing  laws  do  not  mandate  immediate  action  to 
recapitalize  the  deposit  insurance  fund  if it becomes 
insolvent,  nor  do they  specify  how  the  claims  against 
an insolvent  fund  are to be resolved.  Thus,  the  con- 
ditions  that  made  the  present-day  crisis  in the  sav- 
ings  and  loan  industry  possible  are  still  present. 
Regulation  and  Deposit  Insurance 
The  rationale  most  often  given  for  government 
bank  regulation  centers  around  the  importance  of 
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system.  But much  of the  existing  financial  regulatory 
system  cannot  easily  be  rationalized  on  these 
grounds.  A growing  body  of historical  research  makes 
clear that  the  existing  regulatory  structure  developed 
to  address  many  different  public  policy  goals,  with 
bank  safety  and  financial  stability  constituting  only 
one  of  those  goals.10 
When  legislation  sets  out  complex  rules  govern- 
ing  economic  relations  and  market  structure,  it  is 
common  for  government  regulatory  agencies  to  be 
established  to interpret,  administer,  and enforce  those 
rules.  Because  legislation  rarely  specifies  exact 
responses  to every  conceivable  set  of circumstances, 
regulatory  agencies  typically  are  granted  a  certain 
amount  of discretion  in interpreting  policy guidelines 
and  engaging  in  rulemaking.  But  when  the  under- 
lying  goals  of an  agency  are  vague  or  seem  to  con- 
flict,  the  grant  of  discretion  gives  regulatory  agen- 
cies  the  power  to  establish  the  relative  importance 
of  different  policy  goals. 
With  discretionary  powers,  the  incentives  facing 
regulators  become  important  factors  determining  the 
primary  goals  of regulation.  As Posner  (1974)  points 
out,  employees  of government  agencies  have  strong 
incentives  to  please  their  legislative  overseers  and 
to perform  competently  to increase  the  value  of their 
future  prospects  in the  private  sector.  The  incentives 
and  priorities  of lawmakers,  in turn,  are  determined 
by  political  forces. 
Because  the  actions  of regulators  can  and  often  do 
result  in  a  redistribution  of  economic  resources, 
regulated  firms have  a considerable  incentive  to lobby 
for  rules  that  they  perceive  to  be  in their  own  self- 
interests.  Thus,  regulators  invariably  face  political 
pressures  when  setting  goals  and  priorities,  though 
these  pressures  are  not  always  explicit. 
r”  Kareken’s  (1986)  comprehensive  analysis  of the  present-day 
system  of bank  regulation  led  him  to  conclude  that  the  system 
could  not  be  rationalized  by  an  appeal  to  concerns  over  safety 
and  soundness,  especially  in the  area  of regulatory  restrictions 
on  bank  branching  and  geographic  expansion.  Shull  (1983) 
produces  historical  evidence  that  early  laws  mandating  the 
separation  of banking  and  commerce  were  rooted  in  concerns 
unrelated  to  safety  and  soundness  issues.  Other  authors  have 
concluded  that  the  securities  underwriting  activities  of commer- 
cial banks  had  little  to do with  the  widespread  bank  failures  that 
accompanied  the  Great  Depression,  and  have  attributed  the 
motivation  behind  the  legal separation  of commercial  and  invest- 
ment  banking  to  factors  unrelated  to  safety  and  soundness 
concerns  (Huertas  1984;  Flannery  1985;  Kaufman  1988;  and 
Shughart  1987). 
Deposit  insurance  requires  some  form  of regula- 
tion and supervision  to contain  the  incentives  for risk- 
taking  inherent  in the  system.  Therefore,  the  issue 
of  deposit  insurance  reform  cannot  be  addressed 
separately  from that  of regulatory  reform.  To  address 
the  issue  of  regulatory  reform,  one  must  first  ask 
whether  the  existing  regulatory  structure  imposes 
conflicting  goals  that  compromise  the  ability  of 
regulators  to  limit  risk-taking  by  banks  and  thrifts. 
A review  of the  events  leading  to the  present  thrift 
crisis  reveals  that  early  resolution  of the  industry’s 
financial problems  was hampered  by conflicting  goals 
embedded  in the  regulatory  system.  The  regulatory 
structure  imposed  on  the  savings  and  loan  industry 
was  designed  in large  part  to  subsidize  credit  flows 
for  residential  housing  by  increasing  the  supply  of 
mortgage  lending.  In  addition  to  being  the  agency 
that  chartered  federal  savings  and  loans,  the  Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board  also bore  responsibility  for 
managing  the  FSLIC.  The  Bank  Board  was  also ex- 
plicitly  charged  with  promoting  private  home  owner- 
ship  as well  as the  interests  of the  savings  and  loan 
industry. 
The  situation  is further  complicated  by the fact that 
state  legislatures  also  have  the  authority  to  charter 
and  regulate  insured  savings  and  loans.  These 
legislatures  can  gain  much  of  the  political  benefits 
derived  from the  subsidization  of thrifts and local con- 
struction  interests  while allowing the FSLIC  to under- 
write  much  of  the  risk. 
Once  the  crisis  began,  deposit  insurance  was 
used  to  keep  many  insolvent  thrifts  open  in  an 
attempt  to prevent  the  reallocation  of resources  from 
those  institutions  and the regions  they  served.  Debate 
over  how  much  of  the  cost  of  recapitalizing  the 
FSLIC  should  be  borne  by  the  thrift  industry  itself 
paralyzed  action  to  resolve  the  crisis  for  a number 
of years.  A reluctance  on  the  part  of lawmakers  to 
appropriate  the funds  needed  to close insolvent  thrifts 
and  recapitalize  the  FSLIC  further  delayed  a resolu- 
tion  of  the  crisis. 
Excessive  risk-taking  on the  part  of insolvent  thrifts 
was tolerated  because  the  regulatory  system  gave  no 
one the incentive  to take  the decisive  steps  that would 
have  been  necessary  to  stop  it.  When  hundreds  of 
savings  and  loans  began  to  fail,  industry  regulators 
lacked  the  resources  to  close  those  institutions  and 
pay  off depositors,  or,  for that  matter,  to adequately 
monitor  them.  At  this  point,  the  FSLIC  itself  was 
insolvent  and its management  began  behaving  as any 
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behave.  Under  the circumstances,  the only alternative 
the  Bank  Board  had to keeping  insolvent  institutions 
open  would  have  been  to  impose  losses  on  insured 
depositors,  an  action  that  was  never  seriously  con- 
sidered.  Legislation  enacted  during  this  period, 
notably  the  Garn-St.  Germain  Act,  made  it clear  that 
lawmakers  preferred  accepting  the  risks  that  came 
with  taking  no  action  against  insolvent  institutions 
to  other  available  alternatives. 
The  response  of the  federal  regulatory  system  to 
events  as  they  unfolded  in  the  course  of  the  thrift 
crisis  stand  in stark  contrast  with  the  way  insolven- 
cies  are  resolved  in  unregulated  private  market 
arrangements.  In  periods  of  financial  distress,  the 
nineteenth  century  clearinghouses  sometimes  found 
it necessary  to suspend  payments.  But those  organi- 
zations  continued  to monitor  all members  closely  and 
acted  promptly  to  force  banks  that  exposed  other 
clearinghouse  members  to excessive  risks  out  of the 
system.  Although  bank  and  thrift  regulators  have  the 
right  to  revoke  deposit  insurance,  they  rarely  exer- 
cise  this  right  as  a  practical  matter. 
Simply  giving regulators  more  discretionary  powers 
to  deal  with  failing  institutions  does  not  appear  to 
offer a solution  to the problem  of limiting losses  borne 
by the  deposit  insurance  funds.  Administrators  of the 
FSLIC  had  greater  discretionary  powers  in  choos- 
ing how  to deal with  financially  troubled  savings  and 
loans  than  did  the  FDIC  in its  dealings  with  failing 
banks.  But the  historical  record  shows  that  the  grant 
of greater  discretionary  powers  did  not  ensure  that 
the  losses  insolvent  institutions  were  permitted 
to  impose  upon  the  insurance  fund  would  be  con- 
tained.  As  Kaufman  (1989,  p.  1) notes: 
bank  regulators  .  .  .  avoid  taking  actions  that  could  put 
them  in  conflict  with  powerful  parties  who  would  experi- 
ence  large  dollar  losses,  such  as  uninsured  depositors  or 
other  creditors,  management,  owners,  and  even  large 
borrowers.  In  addition,  the  regulators  frequently  believe 
that  such  actions  would  be  an admission  of failure  not  only 
of the  bank  but  also  of their  own  agency,  which  is charged 
with  bank  safety  and  evaluated  by  many  on  its  ability  to 
achieve  this  condition. 
Insulating  the  economy  from the potentially  disrup- 
tive effects  of bank  and thrift failures remains  an over- 
riding goal of regulators.  While  it is hard  to take  issue 
with  this  goal,  history  shows  that  when  attempts  to 
minimize  disruption  are  permitted  to  completely 
subvert  the  normal  market  forces  that  would  other- 
wise  act  to  close  insolvent  institutions,  the  results 
can  be  disastrous.  Unless  market  participants  are 
forced  to internalize  some  of the  risk  associated  with 
their  actions,  they  have  no  incentive  to  limit 
risk-taking. 
That  thrift  industry  regulators  were  hampered  by 
conflicting  goals  that  interfered  with  their  ability  to 
protect  the  resources  of the  deposit  insurance  fund 
now  seems  to be  widely  acknowledged.  Avoiding  a 
repetition  of the  current  thrift  industry  crisis depends 
on  our  ability  to  devise  a system  that  will guarantee 
the  prompt  closure  of institutions  once  they  become 
insolvent  while  limiting  the  potential  disruptive 
effects  of  such  occurrences. 
Lessons  from  Bankruptcy  Law  Reform 
The  present  system  of  bankruptcy  laws  were 
enacted  by Congress  in  1978  and  amended  in  1984 
and  1986.  This  legislation  instituted  sweeping 
reforms  to  the  administration  of bankruptcy  courts 
and the  system  of bankruptcy  resolution.  Before these 
recent  reforms,  the  bankruptcy  judge  had  duties 
much  broader  than  those  of  an  impartial  referee. 
Under  the  old  law,  the  bankruptcy  judge  (originally 
called  the  “bankruptcy  referee”)  was  given  the  role 
of administering  bankruptcy  cases  under  the  general 
supervision  of the  district  judge,  who  held  the  ulti- 
mate  legal  authority  to  adjudicate  any  cases  arising 
from  the  bankruptcy  proceedings.  But over  time,  the 
role  and  authority  of  the  referee  grew  until  the 
“referee”  became  a bankruptcy  judge  who  exercised 
judicial  power  to  decide  disputes  among  different 
parties. 
Thus,  the  role  of the  bankruptcy  referee,  or  ad- 
ministrator,  had  grown  beyond  that  envisioned  by 
the  laws  that  created  the  position.  The  authors  of 
the  earlier  law  had  envisioned  a  court-appointed 
administrator  acting  under  the  oversight  of an  inde- 
pendent  and  impartial  judicial  authority.  But  over- 
sight  and  administrative  duties  had  come  to  be 
delegated  to  a  single  agent,  one  who  lacked  the 
insulation  from  outside  influence  normally  provided 
to members  of the judiciary.  According  to Treister, 
et  al.  (1988,  pp.  5-7),  this  dual  role  came  to  be 
perceived  as the  “most  glaring  defect  of the  former 
bankruptcy  system.” 
Dissatisfaction  with  this  system  led  Congress  to 
establish  a special  Commission  on Bankruptcy  Laws 
of the  United  States  to  study,  analyze,  and  recom- 
mend  changes  in the  bankruptcy  laws in  1970.  The 
Commission’s  findings,  published  in  1973,  noted 
that: 
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for  conduct  of both  administrative  and  judicial  aspects  of 
a bankruptcy  case  is incompatible  with  the  proper  perform- 
ance  of the  judicial  function.  Even  if a paragon  of integrity 
were  sitting  on  the  bench  and  could  keep  his  mind  and 
feelings  insulated  from  influences  which  arise  from  his 
previous  official connections  with  the  case  before  him  and 
with  one  of the  parties  to  it,  he  probably  could  not  dispel 
the  appearance  of a relationship  which  might  compromise 
his  judicial  objectivity  (as  cited  in  Treister,  et  al.  1988, 
p.  7). 
One  of the  principal  reforms  brought  about  by the 
Bankruptcy  Reform  Act was to free  the  bankruptcy 
judge  from  acting  in  the  role  of  administrator  and 
enhance  his  judicial  role.  Before  the  Act,  bank- 
ruptcy  “referees”  were  only  appointed  to  serve 
“during good  behavior.”  The  Bankruptcy  Reform  Act 
provided  for the  appointment  of bankruptcy  judges 
to fixed  14-year  terms.  Appointments  were  made  by 
the  president,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  The  Act  also  provided  for  an  independent 
system  of United  States  Trustees  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Justice  Department  for  cases  where  an  ad- 
ministrator  for  the  bankruptcy  estate  needed  to  be 
appointed.” 
What  lessons  do  these  events  hold  for  deposit 
insurance  reform?  The  bankruptcy  code  explicitly 
recognizes  the  possibility  of  conflicts  of  interest 
inherent  in  a  system  where  an  agent  appointed  to 
resolve firm insolvencies  is given roles that may create 
conflicting  goals.  To  avoid  such  potential  conflicts, 
bankruptcy  law provides  for  a separation  of the  dif- 
ferent  roles,  separating  the  referee,  or  bankruptcy 
judge,  from  the  role  of the  trustee  appointed  to  ad- 
minister  the estate.  The  role of the bankruptcy  judge 
is intentionally  limited  to mediating  disputes  among 
different  parties  with  claims  against  the  firm. 
Banking  law gives the  deposit  insurer  the  dual role 
of receiver  and claimant  in the event  of a bank  failure. 
The  potential  for conflicting  goals arising from  such 
a system  would  appear  to  greatly  exceed  those  in- 
herent  in the  old bankruptcy  system.  Recent  bank- 
ruptcy  law reforms  suggest  an alternative  framework, 
one  based  on  judicial  oversight  that  would  sharply 
limit the  discretion  of the  deposit  insurer  in dealing 
with  failing  institutions. 
rr  At  first  Congress  was  not  convinced  that  an  administrative 
apparatus  such  as this,  outside  the Judicial  Branch,  was  needed. 
Accordingly,  a pilot  project  was  established.  The  United  States 
Trustee  system  was  made  a permanent  part  of the  bankruptcy 
system  in  1986  (Treister,  et  al.  1988,  pp.  85-91). 
A  Role  for  Enhanced  Judicial  Oversight 
One  necessary  ingredient  for providing  successful 
deposit  insurance  is a precommitment  to closing  in- 
solvent  depository  institutions  promptly.  With 
unregulated  commercial  firms,  this precommitment 
is achieved  through  legal bankruptcy  proceedings  in 
which  claims  against  the  insolvent  firm are  resolved 
under  the  auspices  of an independent  judiciary.  This 
observation  suggests  that  one  way  to  credibly  com- 
mit  to  close  failing  banks  and  thrifts  would  be  to 
expand  the  role  of the  judicial  system  to  make  the 
resolution  of bank  and  thrift  insolvencies  subject  to 
the  same  kind  of judicial  oversight  that  characterizes 
regular  bankruptcy  proceedings.  Posner  (1974) 
emphasizes  that  many  features  of law are  designed 
to pursue  overall  efficiency  gains.  By its very  design, 
the  legal  system  is more  immune  to  political  pres- 
sures than government  regulators.  Using the judiciary 
to limit the  discretion  of regulatory  agencies  may  be 
one  way  of ensuring  that  the  regulatory  process  is 
governed  by  legislative  guidelines. 
To  ensure  that  failing banks  and  thrifts  are forced 
into  legal  insolvency  proceedings,  some  depositors 
must  be  put  at risk  of loss.  Otherwise,  market  par- 
ticipants  will  have  no  incentive  to  force  a  failing 
institution  into insolvency  proceedings.  The  distinc- 
tion  between  the  insured  and  uninsured  depositor 
must  be restored.  As Todd  (1988)  notes,  deposit  in- 
surance  was  never  intended  to  prevent  all  bank 
failures,  only  to  provide  for  the  prompt  resolution 
of  such  failures. 
Boyd  and  Rolnick  (1988)  have  forwarded  a plan 
to  administer  federal  deposit  insurance  more  like 
private  insurance  arrangements  by  instituting  a 
system  of  coinsurance.  Under  this  plan,  deposits 
would  be fully insured  up to some  amount  sufficient 
to  protect  small,  unsophisticated  depositors.  Large 
depositors  would  be  subject  to  some  risk  of  loss, 
receiving  perhaps  90  or 95  cents  for every  dollar  on 
deposit  in the  event  of  a bank  failure.  The  advan- 
tage  of this  plan  is that  it would  place  known  limits 
on  the  maximum  extent  of losses  borne  by  deposi- 
tors,  while still giving large,  sophisticated  depositors 
the  incentive  to  monitor  their  banks. 
In the  event  of a bank  failure,  depositors  could  be 
given  prompt  access  to most  of their  funds  through 
a procedure  similar to the  modified  payout  procedure 
used  by  the  FDIC  before  the  failure  of Continental 
Illinois  National  Bank  (Benston,  et  al.  1986,  ch.  4). 
In  a  modified  payout,  uninsured  depositors  were 
given  immediate  access  to’  most  of  their  funds 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  23 based  on  preliminary  estimates  of  expected  losses 
resulting  from  the  liquidation  of the  failed bank.  But 
whereas  a modified  payout  involved  liquidation  of the 
affected  institution,  regulators  could  place  the  failed 
institution  in  a  conservatorship  and  continue  to 
operate  it until  it could  be  reorganized  and  returned 
to the  private  sector.  Kaufman  (1989)  argues  that  in- 
sured  depositors  would  have no incentive  to withdraw 
their  funds,  and uninsured  depositors  would  have  no 
incentive  to  run  on  the  financially  troubled  institu- 
tion  after  it had  been  “failed” because  they  could  be 
assured  of  no  further  losses. 
Bank failures could be  administered  under  a system 
of judicial  oversight  with  such  a system.  The  deposit 
insurer  would  represent  one  of the  claimants  against 
the  firm.  In  cases  where  retaining  present  manage- 
ment  is not  deemed  desirable,  a conservator  could 
be  appointed  to  run  the  institution.  Under  such 
judicial  proceedings,  the  deposit  insurer  would  be 
limited  to  paying  only  insured  depositors. 
Other  Alternatives 
Simply  placing  bank  failure  resolution  under  a 
system  of enhanced  judicial  oversight  is unlikely  to 
provide  a  panacea  for  all  the  problems  currently 
facing  the  banking  and  thrift  industries.  But it would 
bring  about  an  improvement  in bank  failure  resolu- 
tion  methods,  and  would  be  consistent  with  other 
reforms  now  under  debate.  Two  sets  of reforms  are 
noted  briefly  below. 
100 percent  reseme  banking  Some  analysts  and 
policymakers  have  argued  that  imposing  market 
discipline  on  depositors  is  not  practical  because  it 
would  disrupt  banking  markets.  One  argument  says 
that  there  are  too  many  potential  externalities  in- 
volved  with  the  operation  of the  payments  system 
to  risk  letting  a  large  depository  institution  fail.  If 
safety and soundness  is truly an overriding  policy goal, 
then  that  goal  can  be  achieved  by  requiring  banks 
to  hold  only  safe  assets.  This  is  the  100  percent 
reserve  banking  proposal,  advocated  by Mints,  and 
later,  Friedman,  and  most  recently  resurrected  by 
Kareken  (1985),  and,  in  a  slightly  different  form, 
by  Litan  (1986).  Such  a system  would  truly  be  safe 
because  it would  remove  all private  credit  risk  from 
the  payments  system,  substituting  instead  the  credit 
of  the  government,  the  ultimate  guarantor  of  the 
safety  of the  system.  Kareken  (1985),  Gorton  and 
Pennachi  (1989),  and  Jacklin  (1989)  postulate  that 
this  type  of  banking,  which  amounts  to  a  money 
market  mutual  fund  in  short-term  safe  securities, 
would  be  a natural  product  of free-market  competi- 
tion  under  current  technology  and  modern  financial 
market  arrangements. 
With  the  institution  of “safe  banks,”  lending  ac- 
tivities  would  be  conducted  by  uninsured  affiliates. 
Such  uninsured  affiliates  would  still  face  a  risk  of 
insolvency.  The  proposed  insolvency,resolution  pro- 
cedures  outlined  above  could  be  adopted  to deal with 
failing  lending  affiliates. 
An  enhanced r&e j&- ma&et forces  As  experience 
with  the  nineteen  century  clearinghouse  system 
shows,  banks  have  a natural  advantage  in monitor- 
ing the  creditworthiness  of other  banks.  If given  the 
proper  incentives,  private  monitoring  by  banking 
firms  could  substantially  augment  government  super- 
visory  efforts.  Banks  would  then  be  expected  to 
police  themselves  as they  did  prior  to  the  advent  of 
deposit  insurance. 
Certain  kinds  of  deregulation  could  actually 
enhance  the  safety  and  soundness  of  the  banking 
system  and  lessen  the  danger  of  bank  runs.  As 
Calomiris  (1989)  points  out,  nationwide  branching 
would  probably  go  a  long  way  toward  providing 
additional  safety  and  soundness.  Canadian  history  is 
instructive  in this  regard,  since  Canada’s  nationwide 
branching  system  proved  immune  to bank  runs  dur- 
ing the Great  Depression.  Haubrich  (1988)  notes  that 
there  were  no  bank  failures  in  Canada  during  the 
193Os,  even  though  their  depression  was  as severe 
as that  of the  United  States.  In the  event  of deregu- 
lation,  normal  application  of antitrust  laws could  en- 
sure  that  competition  in  banking  markets  is  pre- 
served.  Monetary  policy  could  provide  banks  with 
liquidity  in the  event  of a financial  panic  leading  to 
an aggregate  change  in desired  holdings  of currency. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  provided  a detailed  analysis  of the 
savings  and loan crisis. To  understand  the  events  and 
the  needed  reforms,  we  have  drawn  heavily  on  the 
operation  of private  market  relationships.  Like  private 
bondholders,  the  deposit  insurance  agencies  bear  the 
risk associated  with bank  failures and,  therefore,  have 
an  incentive  to  promptly  close  or  reorganize  failing 
banks  or savings  and loans.  But as recent  events  have 
clearly  demonstrated,  the  deposit  insurance  funds 
themselves  bear  some  risk  of  insolvency.  As  long 
as no  formal  mechanism  for  dealing  with  the  insol- 
vency  of a deposit  insurance  fund exists,  there  is some 
chance  that  the  crisis  that  beset  the  savings  and loan 
industry  could  be  repeated. 
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ing  regulators  more  discretionary  authority  will not 
be  sufficient  to guarantee  against  future  insolvencies 
of  one  of  the  deposit  insurance  funds.  The  Bank 
Board  and the  FSLIC  had  more  discretionary  power 
than  the  FDIC,  yet  thrift  industry  regulators  were 
not  able  to  prevent  the  insolvency  of the  FSLIC. 
These  considerations,  as well as the lessons  learned 
from  looking  at the  operation  of the  early  clearing- 
houses,  point  to  a  number  of  key  ingredients  that 
must  be  present  in  any  successful  publicly  admini- 
stered  deposit  insurance  scheme.  The  clearinghouse 
system  was  successful  in  maintaining  safety  and 
soundness  among  banks  because  the  members  of the 
system  had  the  incentive  to  enforce  minimum  net 
worth  standards.  Through  the  threat  of expulsion, 
the  clearinghouses  could  discipline  members  that 
failed  to  meet  the  conditions  of  membership. 
Of course,  administrators  of the  deposit  insurance 
funds  also  have  such  power  in principle,  but  do  not 
always  have  the  incentive  to exercise  it. As Milgrom 
and  Roberts  (1988)  point  out: 
Even  if  the  executive  authority  is  unusually  competent, 
public  spirited,  and  immune  to  bribes  .  .  . it  may  still  be 
desirable  to  limit  its  discretion,  for  two  reasons.  First,  in 
order  to provide  correct  incentives  to others  in the  organi- 
zation,  the  authority  must  be  able  to  make  commitments 
to  act  against  its  own  interests  in  the  future,  and  these 
commitments  are  not  credible  unless  there  are  some 
effective  limits  on  the  centre’s  powers.  .  .  . The  second 
reason  to  limit  the  discretion  of  an  honest,  competent 
decision-maker  is  to  discourage  rent-seeking  behavior  by 
others  who  are  affected  by  the  centre’s  decision.  .  .  . the 
mere  willingness  of  the  centre  to  consider  seriously  a 
decision  with  large  redistributional  consequences  will 
cause  other  economic  agents  to waste  significant  resources 
in  attempts  to  influence  or  block  it  or  to  delay  its  imple- 
mentation.  In  public  decision-making,  for  example,  enor- 
mous  resources  are  spent  in proposing  legislation  or regu- 
lations  and  in  advocating  or  opposing  these  proposals, 
as  well  as  in  filing  and  maneuvering  for  advantage  in 
lawsuits. 
Deposit  insurance  as it is presently  administered 
removes  all elements  of market  discipline  from bank- 
ing  markets,  making  it  a  political  rather  than  an 
economic  decision  to let an institution  fail. With  the 
potential  transfer  of such  large  amounts  of resources 
at  stake,  sqme  form  of  breakdown  in  regulatory 
discipline  should  not  be  surprising. 
In the  case  of the  FSLIC,  the  agency  was  forced 
to exercise  regulatory  forbearance  because  it lacked 
the  resources  it would  have  needed  to  close  insol- 
vent  institutions.  Acknowledging  the  fund’s  insol- 
vency  and  forcing  insured  depositors  to  bear  a part 
of the  cost  was  never  regarded  as an acceptable  solu- 
tion  to dealing  with  the  crisis.  But lawmakers,  while 
not  wishing  to impose  losses  on  insured  depositors, 
proved  reluctant  to  appropriate  the  funding  needed 
to  deal  with  the  problem.  The  strategy  chosen  was 
one  of  tolerating  greater  risk-taking  on  the  part  of 
insured  savings  and  loans,  in the  hope  that  the  need 
for  government  funding  could  be  obviated. 
While  recently  enacted  reforms  place  limits on the 
ability of failing thrifts  to take  on excessive  risks,  they 
do  not  change  the  incentives  facing  market  partici- 
pants  and regulatory  agencies,  and  cannot  guarantee 
that  one  of  the  deposit  insurance  funds  will  not 
become  insolvent  in  the  future.  Therefore,  the 
reforms  enacted  to  date  cannot  ensure  that  failing 
institutions  will always  be  dealt  with  promptly  in the 
future. 
Deposit  insurance  reform  should  include  legislative 
guidelines  specifying  how  bank  and thrift  failures  are 
resolved  and  how  the  insolvency  of  one  of  the 
deposit  insurance  funds  is to be  resolved.  A central 
conclusion  of  this  paper  is  that  such  legislative 
guidelines  could  be  enforced  through  a greater  role 
for judicial  oversight.  There  may  be  good  reasons 
for  exempting  banks  and  thrifts  from  the  same 
bankruptcy  laws  applied  to  unregulated  firms,  but 
increased  market  discipline  and  enhanced  judicial 
oversight  of bank  failure resolution  proceedings  could 
play  a constructive  role  in deposit  insurance  reform. 
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